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CLASS MATTERS 
ERICA J. HASHIMOTO∗ 
Poor people constitute one of the most overrepresented categories of 
people in the criminal justice system.  Why is that so?  Unfortunately, we 
simply do not know, in large part because we have virtually no information 
that could provide an answer.  As a result of that informational vacuum, 
policymakers either have ignored issues related to economic class, instead 
focusing on issues like drug addiction and mental illness as to which there 
are more data, or have developed fragmented policies that touch on 
economic status issues only tangentially.  The bottom line is that without 
better data on the profile of poor defendants, coherent policy to address 
issues related to economic status simply will not be enacted.  Because we 
lack data on economic status, we also cannot ascertain whether the system 
enforces criminal laws equally or whether it targets poor people.  The 
inability to prove (or disprove) class discrimination prevents policymakers 
from enacting any solutions and leads to mistrust in the system. 
This Article highlights the potential beneficial uses of general data on 
criminal defendants and data on economic status of criminal defendants in 
particular.  It goes on to document the data we currently have on income 
levels of criminal defendants, and the shortcomings both in our analysis of 
that data and in our data collection.  Finally, the Article provides a 
roadmap for how states and the federal government should collect and 
analyze data on the economic status of criminal defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States spends nearly two hundred billion dollars each year 
to combat crime.1
 
∗ Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  I appreciate the very 
helpful comments of my colleagues Dan Coenen, Lori Ringhand, and Andrea Dennis.  All 
errors, of course, are my own. 
  Both because of the amount of money involved and 
1 See KRISTEN A. HUGHES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: JUSTICE 
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003, at 1 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf (noting that in 2003, the United States 
spent $185 billion on police protection, corrections, and judicial and legal activities, an 
increase of 418% from the amount spent in 1982). 
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because of the importance of this issue, policymakers should rest their 
decisions on accurate data so that there is some assurance that the vast 
criminal justice budget is being effectively spent.  In too many instances, 
however, legislators develop policy and laws with little or no information.  
Part of the reason that policymakers do not consider data may be that data 
are unavailable.  In particular, demographic information on defendants in 
the system (with the possible exception of information regarding race and 
gender) is almost nonexistent.  Indeed, one of the most potentially 
significant factors—the economic status of the defendant—has been almost 
completely ignored. 
The data we do have show that poor people become defendants in 
criminal cases at a much higher rate than do non-poor people.  Without 
collecting more data on those defendants—their criminal histories, the 
crimes with which they are charged, the outcomes of their cases, their 
sentences, and the extent of their overrepresentation in the system—we can 
neither generate interest from policymakers in the problems presented by 
the sheer volume of poor people in the system nor begin to identify causes 
and solutions for this overrepresentation. 
Some might argue that collecting more data is not necessary because 
everyone knows that the criminal justice system prosecutes more indigent 
than non-indigent persons.  Without data, however, we do not, and cannot, 
know the extent of this disparity and the issue lacks resonance.  In this 
context, data represent the most powerful, descriptive tool.  In addition, 
without data, we cannot determine the causes of overrepresentation, so we 
cannot develop effective solutions.  A very simple (and admittedly over-
simplified) example makes the point.  If, for instance, the data reveal that 
poor defendants commit all types of offenses at a uniformly higher rate than 
non-poor defendants, that information may suggest that poor defendants 
commit crimes for reasons other than economic need.  If that is the case, 
any programs targeted at reducing offense rates of poor people need to 
recognize that the motivation for the criminal behavior may not be 
economic need and may need to incorporate a model of promoting not only 
job placement but also community investment and engagement.2
In addition to its importance in developing rational criminal justice 
policy, information collection plays a critical role in ensuring even-handed 
  On the 
other hand, if the differential in offense rates between poor and non-poor 
defendants does vary depending on the economic nature of the crime, the 
message may be that job programs constitute the best tool for countering 
criminal activity. 
 
2 As discussed below, a therapeutic jurisprudence program might be warranted in such a 
situation.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
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administration of our laws.  Again, an example illustrates the point.  If the 
percentage of poor people who are prosecuted for a particular crime—for 
instance, drug possession3—is much greater than the percentage of poor 
people who commit the offense, this fact may lead to questions about our 
enforcement efforts.  Do police target poor people or neighborhoods where 
poor people live?  Are prosecutors more likely to charge poor people for 
drug offenses than wealthy people?  The answers to these questions may 
well be no, but we cannot know if that is the case unless we collect data.4
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Citing examples, Part II describes 
the benefits of collecting and analyzing data on defendants in the criminal 
justice system—namely, that data further the development of more rational 
criminal justice policy and provide a means of assuring equal enforcement 
of the laws.  Part III describes the data on economic status that states and 
the federal government now collect and the deficiencies in the available 
data.  It also sets forth the argument that analysis of these data is necessary 
both to develop effective criminal justice policy and to ensure that the law 
does not discriminate against poor people.  Finally, Part IV proposes new 
methods of analysis for the existing data and advocates the collection of 
more detailed data, particularly at the state level. 
 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING DATA ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
There are two principal reasons we should collect data about 
defendants in the criminal justice system.  First, data should (although they 
often do not) inform policy decisions regarding the definitions of crimes, 
the development of programs, and the enactment of sentencing provisions.  
After all, regardless of the goals policymakers have for the criminal justice 
system—whether crime prevention or retribution or both—they need 
information in order to assess whether the money is being spent in the most 
cost-effective way to further those goals.  If we do not know who is being 
prosecuted for crimes, legislators and those working in the criminal justice 
system cannot make informed decisions.  Second, we cannot have any 
assurance that laws are being enforced uniformly—and not on the basis of 
unconstitutional or arbitrary factors such as race or gender—unless we 
know who is being prosecuted, convicted and punished, and for what. 
 
3 I use drug possession for this example because we have fairly detailed statistics on the 
demographic profile of drug users.  See infra Part III.B. 
4 As discussed below, I recognize that even if the data established unequal enforcement, 
there may not be a legal remedy for that inequality.  Even without a constitutional remedy, 
however, those data still could lead to changes in the enforcement mechanisms.  See infra 
Part III.B.2. 
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A. DATA AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING RATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
POLICY 
Over the last twenty or thirty years, political considerations generated 
by highly publicized cases have significantly affected criminal justice 
policy.5  Indeed, many pieces of legislation creating new crimes and setting 
sentences both for new crimes and for existing crimes have been driven by 
media coverage of the most high profile cases.  Political considerations 
generated by media coverage of atypical high-profile cases, however, 
provide a poor basis for shaping the criminal justice system.  To illustrate 
the importance of considering data rather than passing legislation based on 
media frenzy, consider Congress’s enactment of legislation that created the 
one-hundred-to-one sentencing differential for powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine offenses under the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.6  The Act 
set mandatory minimum penalties for defendants convicted of trafficking 
“kingpin” quantities of drugs: one thousand grams of heroin or five 
thousand grams of cocaine powder would lead to a ten year mandatory 
minimum sentence.7  With respect to crack cocaine,8 Congress established 
the “kingpin” level for the mandatory minimum ten-year sentence at fifty 
grams, one-hundredth of the amount that would trigger the same mandatory 
minimum penalty for powder cocaine.9
 
5 See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A POLICYMAKER’S 
GUIDE TO HATE CRIMES 5 (1997) (“In the area of criminal justice, it is political reality that 
public policy sometimes is driven more by emotions and perceptions—sometimes 
misperceptions—than hard empirical data.”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and 
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 925–26 (2006) (noting that the 
public’s view of the criminal justice system is formed on the basis of sensational news 
accounts of atypical cases); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 330 (2004) (“American legislators are particularly responsive to public 
concerns about crime . . . .  The political responsiveness of American criminal justice makes 
the input of expertise from social scientists, Sentencing Commission staff, and other 
academics or policy analysts less influential.”); Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing and Data: 
The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 1 (2003) (“On the legislative level, 
Congress is infamous for taking dramatic actions concerning sentencing on the spur of the 
moment based more on incendiary rhetoric than reason.”) (footnote omitted); William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2548, 2558 (2004) (“Every generation has its high-profile crime stories and media frenzies, 
which leave behind a trail of new criminal prohibitions.”). 
 
6 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. 
7 See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 
1287 (1995). 
8 Crack cocaine is made by boiling powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride) with baking 
soda.  Crack generally is smoked, while powder is sniffed.  Id. at 1290–91. 
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
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Much has been written about the reasons Congress settled on the 100:1 
ratio for powder and crack cocaine.10  From those reports, it is clear that 
Congress set that ratio without considering any data on either the relative 
harmfulness of the drugs at issue11 or the amounts of these drugs that 
“kingpins” ordinarily would traffic.12  The Act itself was passed in record 
time,13 without committee hearings to debate the issues in the bill.14  Instead 
of focusing on the science of crack cocaine and data on its usage, debate 
centered on congressional concerns about the “crack epidemic” in urban 
areas that had been the subject of numerous media stories,15 including a 
high-profile Newsweek article.16  Much attention also focused on the recent 
death of basketball star Len Bias, a University of Maryland standout who 
died of a cocaine overdose the night after he was drafted by the Boston 
Celtics.17
 
10 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing 
Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 20–21 (2007); Sklansky, 
supra note 
 
7, at 1290–97. 
11 See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and 
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 409 (1995) (noting that the Subcommittee on Crime “did not 
determine the relative harmfulness of different drugs”). 
12 As Professor Sklansky observes, there really is no such thing as a “kingpin” crack 
trafficker because “[a]s Congress appears to have recognized, large-volume drug traffickers 
generally do not deal in crack; they deal in its precursor, powder cocaine.  Defendants caught 
trafficking in crack thus are almost always the street-level retailers of the cocaine trade, not 
the wholesalers.”  Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1288 (citation omitted). 
13 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 117 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_ 
Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/199502_RtC_Cocaine
_Sentencing_Policy/chap5-8.pdf [hereinafter USSC REPORT] (“Apparently because of the 
heightened concern [over crack], Congress dispensed with much of the typical deliberative 
legislative process, including committee hearings.”). 
14 See Sterling, supra note 11, at 408–09 (noting that the House Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Crime completed all of its work on the bill in just five weeks, and that much of the usual 
procedure was “circumvented” for this bill). 
15 See USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 122 (“Some assertions made in these [media] 
reports were not supported by data at the time and in retrospect were simply incorrect.  One 
report in 1986, for example, labeled crack cocaine as ‘America’s drug of choice.’ . . .  The 
first statistics on crack cocaine use compiled by NIDA subsequent to the report showed that 
snorting powder cocaine was still the preferred method of ingestion by 95 percent of cocaine 
users.”) (internal citations omitted). 
16 See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1294. 
17 See, e.g., USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 122–23; Sterling, supra note 11, at 408 
(describing the compressed time frame for consideration of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 following Bias’s death of a purported cocaine overdose); Michael Tonry, Rethinking 
Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1787 (1999).  
Interestingly, although the media initially reported that Bias had died of crack overdose, it 
turned out that Bias had snorted powder cocaine.  USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 123. 
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Congress’s failure to consider any scientific or usage data before 
passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and in particular before adopting 
the 100:1 ratio, has had negative consequences for federal drug policy.  
First, the Act has been used primarily to prosecute minor street-level retail 
sellers of crack cocaine, rather than wholesale sellers of drugs, completely 
undermining the purpose of the Act.18  To put it another way, the resources 
that Congress intended to allocate to combat large-scale drug traffickers 
instead were diverted to prosecuting and incarcerating street-level dealers.  
Second, as discussed below, the focus on prosecuting street-level retailers 
of crack cocaine, combined with the severe penalties for those convicted 
under the Act, has led to the mass incarceration of young, African-
American men.19
The history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 illustrates the dangers 
of making criminal law policy in the absence of sound data.  Fortunately, 
there are also numerous examples of legislators and policymakers collecting 
and using data to develop criminal justice policy.  Sentencing guidelines 
legislation provides one example,
 
20
1. Sentencing Guidelines 
 and the developments of drug courts 
and of mental health courts provide two more.  The data used in 
formulating these programs are far from perfect and certainly have been 
subject to criticism.  Nonetheless, these reforms demonstrate the benefits 
both of considering data in the development of criminal justice policy and 
of creating mechanisms to collect data in order to assess the effectiveness of 
those policies over time. 
Through the late 1970s and 1980s, a number of states developed 
sentencing guidelines that were designed to curb sentencing discretion of 
judges.  Although the development of guidelines varied across jurisdictions, 
data played a critical role both in the initial creation of guidelines systems 
and in monitoring their impact.  Concerns about lack of sentencing 
uniformity and problems with prison overcrowding spurred sentencing 
 
18 See USSC REPORT, supra note 13, at 158 (reporting that 59.6% of crack cocaine 
defendants in federal prisons were street-level retailers). 
19 See infra Part II.B. 
20 See, e.g., Chanenson, supra note 5, at 12 (“[T]he necessity of sentencing data should 
be virtually self-evident.  How else can we hope to know if what we are attempting to do 
through both sentencing policy and individual sentencing decisions is actually working?”); 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, “The Wisdom We Have Lost”: Sentencing Information 
and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 377–78 (2005) (arguing that although we now have 
significantly more data on sentencing than we did thirty-five years ago, that data still is 
incomplete). 
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reform.21  Believing that finding solutions to both of these problems 
required collection and consideration of information related to sentencing 
practices, drafters of guidelines in at least some states used data to set initial 
guidelines ranges.  Perhaps more importantly, sentencing commissions 
collected extensive data on the implementation of the guidelines in order to 
ensure that they were meeting their statutory goals.22
Minnesota, the first state to develop sentencing guidelines, provides a 
telling example.  In 1978, the state legislature established the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission and directed the commission to develop 
sentencing guidelines.
 
23  The legislature instructed the commission, when 
developing and amending the guidelines, to consider “capacity 
constraint”—the relationship between the severity of prison sentences and 
the space available to house prisoners—among other factors.24  Focusing on 
the capacity constraint goal, the commission developed a detailed computer 
model to project expected prison populations that would result from 
different variations of proposed guidelines.25  The commission also began 
collecting data almost immediately after its formation and has continued to 
collect data on sentencing in Minnesota ever since.26  Relying on this 
information, Minnesota authorities have crafted changes to the guidelines 
over time, including amendments that reduced the durations of prison 
sentences for some offenses because the data showed that Minnesota was 
approaching its prison capacity.27
The data collected by the commission, along with the legislature’s 
directives concerning relevant factors for sentencing, have resulted in a 
much more coherent overall sentencing policy than had previously 
existed.
 
28
 
21 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, 32 CRIME 
& JUST. 131, 132 (2005) (noting Minnesota’s legislative goals of reducing “disparity in the 
treatment of similarly situated offenders” and “coordinat[ing] sentencing policy with 
available correctional resources, especially prison and jail capacities”). 
  In particular, because of the commission’s focus on considering 
22 See Chanenson, supra note 5, at 1 (“Legislatures and sentencing commissions can and 
do use data to craft and improve sentencing policy on a systemic level.”). 
23 See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF 
MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 28 (1988).  
24 Id. at 51. 
25 See Frase, supra note 21, at 147. 
26 See Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 279 n.2 
(1992) (observing that the Minnesota commission has “routinely collected a large amount of 
data on all felony sentences” giving rise to a “rich source of data and commentary”). 
27 See id. at 286. 
28 Minnesota’s policy decisions have been the subject of at least some criticism, but 
regardless whether one agrees with those policy choices, the overall sentencing scheme 
appears to have advanced those goals.  See Frase, supra note 21, at 136–37. 
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capacity constraints in developing and modifying the guidelines, 
Minnesota, at least through the 1980s, managed to reserve its prison space 
for the most serious offenders thereby avoiding the prison overcrowding 
problems that plagued the rest of the country.29  In 1979, the nationwide 
incarceration rate for state prisoners was 126 per 100,000 people.30  By 
1990, the nationwide rate had more than doubled to 272 per 100,000 
people,31 and prison systems throughout the country were struggling with 
prison overcrowding issues.  In large part because of the effect of the 
guidelines, the incarceration rate in Minnesota during that same period did 
not rise nearly as significantly.  In 1979, the year before the Minnesota 
guidelines went into effect, the incarceration rate in Minnesota was 51 per 
100,000 people, and by 1990, it had risen only to 72 per 100,000 people.32
Since 1990, incarceration rates in Minnesota have increased much 
more significantly, but primarily as a result of factors beyond the 
commission’s control.  Two factors have radically affected incarceration 
rates in Minnesota.
  
Perhaps most importantly, because Minnesota had carefully considered how 
the limited prison resources should be allocated, it did not run out of space 
as other state prison systems did. 
33  First, the number of defendants prosecuted and 
sentenced has increased significantly, at least in part due to the increased 
number of defendants sentenced for drug crimes.34  Second, the Minnesota 
legislature, like Congress and state legislatures across the country, has 
increased the number of crimes that carry with them mandatory minimum 
sentences.35
 
29 See Frase, supra note 
  Thus, as one commentator notes, although sentencing policy 
“under the guidelines has become much more data driven, comprehensive, 
and consistent . . . it has only been partially insulated from political 
26, at 334 (concluding that because of the sentencing guidelines, 
Minnesota through the 1980s “manag[ed] to avoid the serious problems of prison and jail 
overcrowding (and court intervention) which have become the norm in most states”). 
30 See PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INCARCERATION RATES FOR PRISONERS UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION, PER 100,000 
RESIDENTS (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2040. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 The Minnesota guidelines, like the sentencing guidelines in many states, also have 
been affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2003), holding that Washington’s sentencing guideline system was unconstitutional because 
it required the court to sentence the defendant for conduct not proven to a jury.  The effects 
of Blakely on incarceration rates, however, are not yet clear. 
34 See Frase, supra note 21, at 136 (noting that in the period from 1981 through 2002, the 
total number of felons sentenced for drug crimes per year more than quadrupled, resulting in 
a doubling of the total number of felons sentenced per year). 
35 See id. at 159–62.  
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pressure.”36
2. Drug Courts 
  Data have not completed solved the problem of politics and 
sentencing policy in Minnesota, but the experience with the guidelines 
suggests that data in the hands of policymakers—here the sentencing 
commission—can lead to much more coherent and effective criminal justice 
policy. 
Another example of the use of data to influence criminal justice policy 
has come in the area of drug courts, which provide intensive and court-
monitored treatment to defendants whose involvement in the criminal 
justice system is primarily attributable to their drug addiction.37
The court system in Miami–Dade County created the first drug 
treatment court in 1989.
  Drug 
courts have developed over the past twenty years primarily through the 
initiative of local courts, with the help of state and local legislation and 
assistance from Congress.  Reform legislation has been the direct result of 
data documenting the extent of drug use among those charged with criminal 
offenses and data evaluating the success of the drug court approach. 
38  The effort was motivated both by concerns about 
prison overcrowding39 spawned by increases in drug-related prosecutions 
and penalties,40
 
36 Id. at 137. 
 and by the concerns of those who worked within the 
37 This is a very broad definition, but a more detailed definition is not possible because 
there is significant variation among drug court programs.  See RYAN S. KING & JILL 
PASQUARELLA, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp_drugcourts.pdf (“Because drug courts are designed 
and operated at the local level, there are fundamental differences . . . .”).  One point of 
clarification regarding the use of the term “drug court” is, however, in order.  This Article 
uses the term “drug court” to refer to drug treatment courts modeled after the Miami–Dade 
County drug treatment court described below.  The term drug court has also been used to 
refer to courts that implemented programs to “fast-track” drug possession cases.  See Richard 
C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1205, 1207 (1998).  However, this Article uses the term only to include drug treatment 
courts. 
38 John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice 
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 942 (2000) (“[K]ey Miami justice leaders in 1989, such as 
Chief Judge Gerald Wetherington, Judge Herbert Klein, Dade County’s State Attorney Janet 
Reno, Public Defender Bennet Brummer, and Timothy Murray (the Office of Substance and 
Abuse Control Director), improvised by using drug courts to respond to a crisis in the 
criminal justice system.”). 
39 In 1988, the prison population in two-thirds of the states exceeded their maximum 
prison capacity.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1988, at 5 (1989). 
40 See Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psychological 
Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265, 
269 (2006) (describing the “massive influx of prisoners” in the late 1970s and early 1980s as 
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criminal justice system that prison sentences were not solving the drug 
problem.41  The original concept was to involve defendants in drug 
treatment programs with hands-on oversight by judges assigned to their 
cases as a key part of the resolution of the criminal charges.42  Although the 
idea of a drug treatment court initially met with “embarrassed silence and 
out-of-hand dismissal,”43 in the ensuing twenty years, drug courts have 
become commonplace.  In 2009, 2,038 drug courts were operating across 
the country, in 1,416 of the 3,155 counties in the country.44  Moreover, as of 
2007, forty-one states had enacted legislation related to the planning, 
operation, or funding of drug courts.45
The tremendous growth in the number of drug courts is attributable to 
two data-driven factors.  First, these courts have made a concerted effort, 
supported by the federal government, to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
programs they operate—both in terms of reducing recidivism
 
46 and in terms 
of cutting prison and jail costs47
 
“unprecedented”); Franklin E. Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal Sanction, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 809, 809 (1993). 
—and at least some of those assessments 
41 See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal 
Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
439, 448–49 (1999) (“The emergence of [drug courts] reflects the growing recognition on 
the part of judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel that the traditional criminal justice 
methods of incarceration, probation, or supervised parole have not stemmed the tide of drug 
use among criminals and drug-related crimes in America.”). 
42 See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 936. 
43 Id. at 927. 
44 See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY STATE AND COUNTY (2009), available at 
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2150.pdf. 
45 See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DRUG 
COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE 114 (2007), available at http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/ 
documents/2105.pdf. 
46 See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE 2–3 (May 1997), available at 
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2079.pdf (reporting that “[m]ost criminal 
justice system professionals estimate that at least 45% of defendants convicted of drug 
possession will recidivate with a similar offense within two to three years,” but “[i]n 
comparison . . . recidivism among all drug court participants has ranged between five percent 
to twenty-eight percent and less than four percent for graduates [of the drug court 
program]”).  But see Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary: The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. 
REV. 1437, 1479–80 (2000) (arguing that there is no real empirical evidence that drug courts 
reduce recidivism among all participants). 
47 See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
MEMORANDUM RE: COST BENEFITS/COSTS AVOIDED REPORTED BY DRUG COURT PROGRAMS 
AND DRUG COURT PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORTS 2–3 (Apr. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2526.pdf (noting that jurisdictions with 
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report positive outcomes.  As more and more jurisdictions have struggled 
both with jail overcrowding and with recidivism, the existence of these 
reports has made drug courts an increasingly attractive option. 
Second, the federal government has funded both implementation of 
drug courts and assessment of these programs.  In 1994, Congress passed 
legislation providing funding for a new Drug Court Program Office within 
the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice designed to 
provide technical assistance to drug court programs, and it also appropriated 
twelve million dollars to support the development and assessment of those 
programs.48  By 2002, this program had grown to the point that the 
Department of Justice awarded ninety-four grants totaling $34.19 million.49  
In addition to awarding money, participation by the Department of Justice 
has been critical to fostering assessment of drug court outcomes.  In 1997, 
the Department sponsored an initiative by the National Association of Drug 
Court Professionals, which developed a list of the ten necessary elements 
for a successful drug court program.50  The Department also has sponsored 
a clearinghouse to maintain all of the data related to drug court programs 
across the country.51
The widespread implementation of drug courts has not escaped 
criticism both by academics and by lawyers who represent defendants in the 
drug court system.  In particular, some have argued that drug courts’ claims 
of success have been somewhat (if not completely) overstated and that there 
is no empirical evidence that drug courts actually reduce recidivism.
 
52
 
drug court programs reported in 2001 that the program saved them an average of 10,133 
prison/jail days or $667,694). 
  Part 
48 See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 948.  Then-Attorney General Janet Reno, who had 
been instrumental in creating the first drug court in Miami–Dade County, played a critical 
role in the Department of Justice’s support of drug courts. 
49 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS DRUG COURTS GRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 2002, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/DrugCourts/02DCgrants.htm. 
50 See Goldkamp, supra note 38, at 936. 
51 The clearinghouse is operated by American University’s School of Public Affairs in 
conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance.  See Drug Court 
Clearinghouse/Adult Technical Assistance Project, AM. UNIV. JUST. PROGRAMS OFFICE, 
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/project.php?ID=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
52 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1479–80 (“Perhaps the most startling thing about 
the drug court phenomenon is that drug courts have so quickly become fixtures of our 
jurisprudence in the absence of satisfying empirical evidence that they actually work.”).  
Some academics also have criticized the non-adversarial nature of drug court programs, 
suggesting that the nature of the program can infringe on the defendant’s constitutional 
rights or force defense counsel to abandon the role of zealous advocate.  See, e.g., Tamar M. 
Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of 
a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“The standard 
premise behind [treatment] courts is the emasculation of the traditional role of the criminal 
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of the dispute over the success of drug court programs stems from 
differences in how to measure success.  In particular, in determining 
whether drug courts reduce recidivism rates, some examine the recidivism 
rates of drug court graduates,53 while others argue that the relevant group 
for study is those who participate in the drug court program (which would 
include drug court dropouts).54  Because the recidivism rates of graduates 
are so much lower than those of dropouts (indeed, most studies demonstrate 
that drug courts reduce recidivism of graduates),55
That having been said, the dispute over how to measure the success of 
the program demonstrates the value of having collected this data.  As a 
result of the data collection, we now know that drug courts have a much 
greater impact on those who graduate than on those who do not finish, so 
that programs should focus on ways to lower the dropout rates.
 any assessment of the 
success of the program depends on the group being tracked. 
56  Whether 
or not one concludes that drug courts solve the problems they were intended 
to address, the fact that we now have data to measure their success and 
improve their outcomes sets them apart from the vast majority of criminal 
justice programs.57
3. Mental Health Courts 
 
Mental health courts arose out of the same therapeutic justice 
movement that created drug courts,58
 
defender as a zealous advocate fighting against the system.”); Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to 
Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense 
Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539 
(2007).  While these arguments have force, for purposes of this Article, I am more concerned 
with the empirical questions surrounding drug courts than the constitutional questions. 
 and as was the case with drug courts, 
53 See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-
First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 
717, 801–03 (2008) (citing statistics suggesting that nationally, drug court graduates have 
significantly lower recidivism rates than defendants convicted of drug offenses who have not 
participated in a drug court program). 
54 See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1483 (“[M]ost evaluators now agree that the most 
meaningful target group against which the control group must be compared is all drug court 
defendants, not just drug court graduates.”). 
55 KING & PASQUARELLA, supra note 37, at 7 (“[D]rug court participants who graduate 
tend to have much lower recidivism rates than drug court dropouts.”). 
56 See id. (“[The fact that dropouts have a higher recidivism rate than graduates] suggests 
that drug courts experiencing a less than desired effect on rearrest rates may want to focus on 
addressing the program design to encourage higher rates of retention.”). 
57 See Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, 51 ADVOC.: OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION IDAHO ST. B. 14, 14 (Sept. 2008) (arguing that “[f]ew, if any, other criminal 
justice programs have been put to” the same level of scientific scrutiny as drug courts). 
58 Drug courts were the first of the so-called problem-solving courts, and mental health 
courts, like drug courts, attempt to solve the root causes of the defendant’s perpetration of 
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data have fostered their development.  The first mental health court was 
founded in 1997, nearly a decade after the first drug court, and it was 
designed to provide treatment and resources for defendants who had 
become involved in the criminal justice system primarily because of mental 
illness.59
Like drug courts, mental health courts have multiplied rapidly—
although not nearly as rapidly as drug treatment courts
  Because of the similarities in design and inception, the path of 
mental health courts has been remarkably similar to that of drug courts. 
60—and much of the 
same pattern of growth has marked their evolution.  First, although mental 
health courts use the same general approach to the problem—namely the 
provision of mental health treatment enforced by the threat of court 
sanctions—courts have adapted the model depending on the needs of 
particular jurisdictions.61
Second, the growth of mental health courts has largely been the result 
of cooperation among localities, states, and the federal government.  That 
cooperation, in turn, was driven by data establishing the scope of the 
problem of mentally ill defendants in the criminal justice system.  In 2000, 
Congress passed America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project.
  This fine-tuning has meant that jurisdictions 
seeking to develop mental health courts have had to study the mental illness 
problem in their localities and the varying models to determine which 
model will work most effectively. 
62  
The Act authorized ten million dollars per year for fiscal years 2001 
through 2004, to support state or local courts in establishing and running 
mental health courts.  The debates over the Act, as well as the findings 
contained within the Act, were dominated by data on the prevalence of 
mental illness among defendants in the criminal justice system.63
 
the crime.  See BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 3–5 (2003). 
  In 
introducing the bill in the Senate, for example, Senator Mike DeWine of 
59 See Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 
1168, 1170 (2008). 
60 As of 2009, a dozen years after the first mental health court opened, there were more 
than 250 mental health courts in this country.  See LAUREN ALMQUIST & ELIZABETH DODD, 
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A GUIDE TO RESEARCH-INFORMED POLICY AND PRACTICE 2 
(2009), available at http://consensusproject.org/jc_publications/mental-health-courts-a-
guide-to-research-informed-policy-and-practice/Mental_Health_Court_Research_Guide.pdf.  
61 See Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court 
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 826–32 
(2004). 
62 See America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 
Stat. 2399 (2000). 
63 See id. at § 2 (setting forth findings, including data from a Bureau of Justice Statistics 
report that 16% of all inmates in state prisons and local jails suffer from mental illness, and 
that 75% of mentally ill inmates had at least one prior conviction). 
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Ohio highlighted both nationwide statistics establishing that a high 
percentage of defendants in state prisons and local jails are mentally ill and 
recidivate at a high level, and statistics from individual states and localities 
demonstrating high rates of mental illness.64  Similarly, virtually all of the 
representatives who spoke in support of the bill in the House of 
Representatives cited data on mentally ill defendants gathered by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics and private groups.65
As a result of the funding and assistance provided by states
 
66 and the 
federal government, since the passage of America’s Law Enforcement and 
Mental Health Project in 2000,67 mental health courts have expanded 
steadily.  By 2005, there were 125 mental health courts operating in 
counties across the country, a number of which received funding from the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance to help cover the start-up costs,68 and between 
2004 and 2009, the number of mental health courts doubled to 250.69
Most importantly, the cooperative efforts of federal, state, and local 
government agencies have led to the development of research on what does 
and does not work in mental health court operation.
 
70  As with drug courts, 
mental health courts have raised concerns as to fairness and effectiveness.71
 
64 See 145 Cong. Rec. S13972-02, S13983 (1999). 
  
65 See 146 Cong. Rec. H10636-01, H10637-39 (2000). 
66 In addition to the funding provided by the federal government, some states also have 
set up agencies to support the planning and implementation of mental health courts.  See 
Kirk Kimber, Mental Health Courts—Idaho’s Best Kept Secret, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 249, 253–
54 (2008) (describing the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act, which sets forth 
the legislature’s intent to support drug courts and mental health courts). 
67 Additional funding, beyond 2004, was approved with the passage of the Mentally Ill 
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 
(2004).  That Act authorized funding of up to $50 million per year for fiscal year 2005 and 
such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2006–09. 
68 See Developments in the Law, supra note 59, at 1170. 
69 See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 60, at 7–8.  Between 2002 and 2003, the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance provided funding to thirty-seven mental health courts, but between 2006 
and 2009, it provided funding for an additional seventy-four mental health courts.  See E-
mail from Ruby Qazilbash, Senior Policy Advisor for Substance Abuse and Mental Health, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, to Professor Erica J. Hashimoto, University of Georgia School 
of Law (March 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
70 See ALMQUIST & DODD, supra note 60, at 21–28 (discussing the state of the research, 
and suggesting further questions about mental health courts for research and data collection); 
HENRY J. STEADMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, A GUIDE TO COLLECTING MENTAL 
HEALTH COURT OUTCOME DATA 3 (2005) (soliciting data from mental health court providers 
and noting that “[t]he core question in evaluating mental health courts is not, ‘Do mental 
health courts work?’ but rather, ‘What works, for whom, under what circumstances?’”). 
71 See id. (noting the concern of some criminal justice and mental health experts that 
mental health courts work primarily with low-level offenders who otherwise would have 
received either dismissal or minimal punishment, and mental health court participants 
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But the fact that they continue to be the subject of so much study means that 
it is likely they will develop and address those criticisms over time.72
B. ENSURING FAIR AND EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL 
STATUTES 
 
The three examples discussed above demonstrate that data can lead to 
sound decisions in the enactment, implementation, and evaluation of 
criminal justice policies.  In addition to its importance for the development 
of rational criminal justice policy, data collection also must be undertaken 
in order to ensure even-handed enforcement of statutes.  Race 
discrimination provides an illustrative example.  Allegations of race 
discrimination at all levels have dogged the criminal justice system since at 
least the 1970s.73
Before turning to the ways in which data can be used to assure equal 
enforcement, it is helpful to understand the types of data that currently are 
available.  Collecting data on the race of defendants in the criminal justice 
system is a practice of relatively recent vintage, and although the data 
remain incomplete, there is much more statistical information on race now 
than there was twenty years ago.  In the federal courts, a variety of 
agencies—including the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys in the 
Department of Justice, the Pretrial Services Agency, the United States 
Marshals Service, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the 
United States Sentencing Commission, and the Bureau of Prisons—collect 
  But without the collection of data, including data broken 
down by the race of defendants, one can neither assess whether people of 
color are being prosecuted and convicted at higher rates than are whites, 
nor, even if one could show that disproportionate numbers of African 
Americans were being prosecuted, substantiate claims that race 
discrimination played a role in the unequal prosecution. 
 
therefore may end up under court supervision longer than they would have been with 
traditional court adjudication). 
72 Id. at 3 (“Mental health courts are better known and more studied than any other court-
based initiative focused on mental health.”). 
73 See, e.g., CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993) 
(documenting evidence of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity in the criminal 
justice system); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black 
Disruption or Despair?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 165 (1973); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and 
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 16 (1998) (asserting 
that “[a]t every step of the criminal process, there is evidence that African Americans are not 
treated as well as whites—both as victims of crime and as criminal defendants,” and 
recommending that legislatures require prosecutors to complete “racial impact studies” 
containing data on the race of the defendant and victim in each case and actions taken at 
each step in the process); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (documenting evidence that white jurors are more likely to 
convict black defendants than white defendants). 
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data on persons prosecuted in the federal criminal justice system.  The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics compiles the data and makes it available 
through the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center.74
As set forth in Table 1, data on the race of federal defendants (or 
suspects) have been collected by the Pretrial Services Agency of the 
Courts,
 
75 the United States Sentencing Commission,76 the Bureau of 
Prisons,77 and the United States Marshals Service78 since 1987.  Neither the 
Administrative Office of the Courts79 nor the Executive Office for U.S. 
Attorneys,80
At a practical level, this means that data related to race and sentencing 
are available (both from the Sentencing Commission and, if the defendant is 
 however, collects data of this kind. 
 
74 See About the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/index.cfm?p=about_fjsp (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2010).  
75 The U.S. Courts Pretrial Services Act Information System collects and records a 
wealth of data on defendants in federal court, including the defendant’s gender, race, age, 
Hispanic origin, employment status at arrest, education level, criminal history, criminal 
justice status (i.e., whether the defendant was on parole, probation, or pretrial release at the 
time of arrest), history of drug abuse, and whether the defendant was released.  See BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.3.2 
(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.cfm 
[hereinafter 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES].   
76 The U.S. Sentencing Commission collects data on every criminal defendant sentenced 
in federal court.  Each line of data includes a wealth of information not only about the case, 
including the charge(s), the method of adjudication, and the sentence imposed, but also about 
the defendant, including race, gender, age, education level, criminal history, and citizenship.  
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.4–9 
(2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC 08.htm. 
77 The Bureau of Prisons collects data on all federal defendants who are sentenced to 
incarceration and confined within the Bureau of Prisons’ system.  Data on inmates includes 
race, age, gender, citizenship, and whether the inmate is of Hispanic origin.  See 2006 
STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 75, at tbl.7.10. 
78 The U.S. Marshals Service collects data on all suspects it arrests.  The data includes 
the gender, race, age, and citizenship of the suspect.  See 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES, supra 
note 75, at tbl.1.3. 
79 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts keeps data on all criminal defendants 
processed through the federal courts.  Most of the data are case-related, including the types 
of charges, the outcome of the case, and the method of adjudication.  The database keeps 
very little data on defendants and does not keep data on the race of defendants.  See FED. 
JUSTICE STATISTICS RES. CTR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA DICTIONARY FOR 
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED, available at http://fjsrc.urban.org/ 
datadictionary.cfm (describing all of the data variables collected by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts). 
80 The Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys collects data on all suspects investigated 
by the United States Attorney’s Office, including the investigating agency, the nature of any 
charges filed, and the outcome, but it does not collect any data on the race or gender of the 
suspect.  See id. 
2011] CLASS MATTERS 47 
Table 1 
Data Collection by Federal Agencies 
Agency 
People Included 
in Data 
Collection 
Types of 
Information 
Collected 
Collect Data 
on Race? 
Executive 
Office for U.S. 
Attorneys 
Suspects 
Investigated 
Investigating 
agency, whether 
charged, and 
outcome 
No 
Pretrial 
Services 
Agency 
Defendants in 
federal court 
Information related 
to pretrial release Yes 
United States 
Marshal’s 
Service 
Suspects arrested 
and booked 
Information related 
to suspect Yes 
Administrative 
Office of the 
Courts 
Defendants in 
federal court 
Case-related data, 
including type and 
method of 
adjudication 
No 
United States 
Sentencing 
Comm. 
Defendants 
convicted and 
sentenced 
Information 
regarding charge, 
adjudication, and 
sentencing-related 
factors 
Yes 
Bureau of 
Prisons 
Defendants 
sentenced to 
prison 
Information related 
to prisoners Yes 
 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, from the Bureau of Prisons), as are 
data on race and arrest (from the U.S. Marshals Service), and on race and 
pretrial release (from the U.S. Courts Pretrial Services System).  Because 
neither the Executive Office for the U.S. Attorneys nor the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts collects data on race of defendants or suspects 
investigated,81
 
81 See Email from Thomas H. Cohen, Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics, to 
Professor Erica J. Hashimoto, University of Georgia School of Law (Mar. 9, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
 however, data on race and adjudicatory outcomes and data 
on race and the decision to prosecute simply do not exist.  While this leaves 
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a serious gap in the data, because a high percentage of defendants in federal 
court are convicted either by way of trial or by guilty plea, the Sentencing 
Commission’s data still provide a relatively complete profile of those 
persons prosecuted in the federal courts. 
In state courts, where the vast majority of criminal defendants are 
prosecuted, the collection of data on criminal defendants varies widely 
depending on the jurisdiction.  Since 1988, the federal Bureau of Justice 
Statistics has collected data from pretrial services agencies on a sample of 
felony defendants in forty of the largest seventy-five counties in the 
country.82  These data include the types and number of charges, the pretrial 
release status of the defendant, the criminal history of the defendant, the 
age, race, and sex of the defendant, the outcome of the case, and the 
sentence.83
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also collects data on felony sentencing 
from individual states (or counties if the data are kept by counties) through 
the National Judicial Reporting Program.
  The dataset did not originally include data on the race of the 
defendant, but this information has been collected since 1990.  The primary 
problem with this dataset is that it collects data only in the most populous 
counties and only on defendants charged with felonies.  Thus, there are no 
data from smaller jurisdictions or rural areas or for misdemeanor 
defendants. 
84  The database contains extensive 
information on the criminal history, race, gender, ethnicity, and age of the 
defendant, along with information about the method of conviction, the type 
of charges, and the sentence imposed.85
Some individual states, in particular states that have sentencing 
commissions, collect and make available sentencing data on defendants in 
their criminal justice systems.
 
86
 
82 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1990–2006 Cumulative Codebook, in STATE 
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990–2006: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES 4 (2007), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2038/ 
documentation. 
  In most states, the department of 
corrections also compiles demographic information on inmates in the state 
83 See id. 
84 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
BULLETIN: FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf. 
85 See id. 
86 See, e.g., TAMARA FLINCHUM ET AL., N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY 
COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS 
FISCAL YEAR 2007/08, at 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.nccourts.org/ 
Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/07-08statisticalreportR.pdf (listing convictions by 
age, race, and gender of defendant); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING 
PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2009 
(2010), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/sentencing_practices.htm.  
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prison system, at least as to race, age and gender.87  In addition, in 
Minnesota, court clerks ask criminal defendants to complete a questionnaire 
requesting information on gender, race, and ethnicity.88  The clerks then 
forward those forms to statisticians for analysis.89  With the exception of 
Minnesota, however, states do not appear to be collecting data on criminal 
defendants except as it relates to sentencing or corrections.90
While the data admittedly remain incomplete, those concerned about 
issues of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system have used the 
existing data to assess the extent to which the laws operate impartially.  In 
addition, criminal defendants have used the data to try to prove claims of 
race discrimination.  While equal protection claims have rarely succeeded 
in courts,
 
91 at the very least the statistics on race do appear to have 
influenced legislative debates.92
1. The Use of Data to Prove Equal Protection Violations 
 
Criminal defendants’ claims that they have been unconstitutionally 
singled out for prosecution or punishment have not fared well in the courts.  
In spite of that fact, collecting data on race remains critically important 
because, as the Supreme Court’s selective prosecution cases make clear, 
without data, a defendant cannot prevail on a selective prosecution claim.  
Thus, while such claims continue to be very difficult to prove even with 
data, it is possible that more sophisticated data collection may ultimately 
make the claims more readily provable.93
The Court has recognized that, while the government retains “broad 
discretion as to whom to prosecute . . . the decision to prosecute may not be 
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
 
 
87 See, e.g., GA. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT FY 08, at 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Reports/Annual/pdf/FY08_Annual_Report.pdf.  Some 
jurisdictions keep much more detailed information.  For instance, in addition to collecting 
data on gender, race, and sex, the Massachusetts Department of Corrections collects data on 
the marital status, citizenship, religion, and educational level of inmates.  See MASS. DEP’T 
OF CORR., JANUARY 1, 2009 INMATE STATISTICS tbls.17–22 (2009) available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/research_reports/112009.pdf. 
88 See Jon B. Gould, Studying Inequality with One Eye: A New Agenda for Evaluating 
Disparate Treatment in the Courts, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 317, 325 (2002). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 321 (concluding that except the studies relating to sentencing, “[b]y and 
large, the courts lack similar analyses of judicial verdicts, whether they are criminal findings 
of guilt or civil judgments of liability”). 
91 See infra Part II.B.1. 
92 See infra Part II.B.2. 
93 See Gould, supra note 88, at 321 (arguing that courts should collect more data so that 
litigants can assess whether disparate outcomes exist, and if they do, analyze the reasons for 
those disparate outcomes). 
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other arbitrary classification.”94  Most scholars date the “selective 
prosecution” prohibition to 1886, when the Supreme Court held in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins,95 that California violated the Equal Protection Clause when it 
treated people of Chinese descent differently when enforcing an ordinance 
than it treated white people.96
Nearly a century later, the Court answered that question, holding that a 
defendant alleging discriminatorily selective prosecution of a facially 
neutral statute in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate 
both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose.
  Yick Wo held that the Equal Protection 
Clause protects against the discriminatory enforcement of a facially neutral 
statute, while leaving open what a defendant must show in order to prevail 
on a selective prosecution claim. 
97  While the Court 
has intimated that statistical proof demonstrating a “stark” pattern may be 
sufficient to establish discriminatory intent,98
 
94 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 the Court has set a very high 
threshold for using statistical proof in this way.  In McCleskey v. Kemp, for 
instance, the defendant relied on the Baldus study, a detailed statistical 
analysis that showed that African Americans who were charged with and 
convicted of killing white people in Georgia (as McCleskey was) had a 
statistically significantly higher likelihood of being sentenced to death 
compared to both white people who killed white people and African 
95 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
96 See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 159 (1999) (“[T]he principle the court 
established in Yick Wo is straightforward: where the government discriminates based on race 
in its enforcement of the criminal law, it denies equal protection.”).  The petitioner in Yick 
Wo was convicted of violating a San Francisco ordinance that prohibited operating a laundry 
in a wooden building without the permission of the Board of Supervisors.  Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 
at 374.  The undisputed record established that 200 laundry owners of Chinese descent 
applied for such permits and all were denied, while eighty-one white laundry owners applied 
for permits and all but one were granted the permits.  Id.  At least one scholar has concluded 
that because Yick Wo “was not fundamentally a criminal case,” i.e., the discrimination was 
perpetrated by civil authorities—the Board of Supervisors—rather than by prosecutors, it 
does not recognize the selective prosecution doctrine for which it is so often cited.  See 
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1363 (2008).  Regardless whether the doctrine originated with Yick Wo or in later 
cases, it indisputably now exists. 
97 See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608–09; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1968). 
98 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–94 (1987) (citing Yick Wo for the 
proposition that “statistical proof normally must present a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as 
the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the Constitution”).  But see United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (suggesting that in order to prevail on a selective 
prosecution claim, a defendant must provide evidence that a similarly situated person of a 
different race was treated differently). 
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Americans who killed African Americans.99  The Court concluded that 
“[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would 
demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion 
has been abused,” and it therefore held that “the Baldus study is clearly 
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in 
McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”100
In the wake of McCleskey, the challenge facing defendants trying to 
establish selective prosecution claims has only become more difficult.  In 
United States v. Armstrong, the Court held that defendants in federal court 
are not entitled to discovery to prove selective prosecution claims unless 
they first come forward with some evidence that “similarly situated 
defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.”
 
101  
The decisions in McCleskey and Armstrong highlight the importance of 
collecting data on the race of defendants because, without such data, a 
defendant cannot even begin to establish a selective prosecution claim.102  
Indeed, even with the data that are now being collected, selective 
prosecution claims remain virtually (if not completely) impossible to 
prove.103  Thus, court systems ought to expand the data being collected in 
order to ensure that the Constitution is being respected.104
 
99 As the Court described the study, it concluded that  
 
even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white 
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing 
blacks.  According to this model, black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death 
sentence as other defendants.  Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants, such as 
McCleskey, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. 
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.  The defendant also argued that the study established that the 
death penalty in Georgia violated the Eighth Amendment.  The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument as well.  Id. at 313. 
100 Id. at 297. 
101 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). 
102 This is particularly so since Armstrong so severely limits the discovery to which 
defendants are constitutionally entitled. 
103 See COLE, supra note 96, at 159 (concluding that there were “no reported federal or 
state cases since 1886 that had dismissed a criminal prosecution on the ground that the 
prosecutor acted for racial reasons”); Chin, supra note 96, at 1361 n.11 (“It is always 
dangerous to make claims that there are ‘no reported cases’ on a question of law, but my 
research assistant and I looked, and we, like many other researchers, could find none.”). 
104 Some argue that court systems are understandably reluctant to keep data on race of 
defendants both because the data can be misused to reinforce stereotypes about African 
Americans and because there is a lack of consensus about the racial classifications 
themselves.  See Paul Knepper, Race, Racism, and Crime Statistics, 24 S.U. L. REV. 71, 72–
73 (1996).  Although those arguments have force, I think the potential benefits flowing from 
the collection of data—namely, ensuring the fairness of the criminal justice system—
outweigh those concerns. 
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2. Use of Data on Race in the Legislative Process 
Although data on race have not yet led to systemic reform through the 
Equal Protection Clause, they have proven useful in the legislative arena in 
two ways.  First, although many African Americans perceive the criminal 
justice system as unfair,105
First, as discussed above, the mandatory minimum penalties set forth 
in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provided for equal penalties for one 
hundred times the amount of powder cocaine as crack cocaine.
 legislators and those who work within the 
system want to believe that it treats defendants equally, regardless of race.  
Data suggesting that defendants are being treated differently based on race 
upset that view, and therefore may lead to change.  Second, even if data are 
not sufficiently “stark” to prove an equal protection violation, data 
demonstrating disparate impact of laws may still make legislators worry 
that the law is vulnerable to such challenges.  For both of these reasons, 
data that fall short of proving a selective prosecution claim still may result 
in legislative action.  A couple of examples demonstrate this point. 
106  Because 
the overwhelming majority of defendants convicted of crack cocaine 
offenses in federal court over the past twenty years have been African-
American,107 and because crack cocaine penalties in federal court have 
greatly exceeded the penalties for powder cocaine offenses, the percentage 
of African Americans incarcerated in the federal Bureau of Prisons has 
mushroomed over the past twenty-five years.108
Although the data show that the low quantity threshold for mandatory 
minimum crack penalties has had a disproportionate impact on African 
Americans, equal protection challenges to these mandatory minimums 
 
 
105 See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 983, 998 (2004) (describing hip-hop artists’ view of the criminal justice system as a 
means of suppressing those who “rebel[] against the oppressive status quo”). 
106 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. 
107 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 16 tbl.2-1 (2007) (setting out figures establishing that in 1992, 91.4% of 
those convicted of crack offenses in federal court were African-American, in 2000, 84.7% 
were African-American, and in 2006, 81.8% were African-American).  In contrast, African 
Americans constitute a relatively small percentage of those convicted of powder cocaine 
offenses in federal court.  See id. (setting forth data that African Americans constituted 
between 27% and 30% of those convicted for powder cocaine offenses). 
108 See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted 
Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 22–29 (2007) (attributing disparities in 
rates of black imprisonment in part to federal crack cocaine penalties); Note, Winning the 
War on Drugs: A “Second Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 
1485–86 (2000) (noting that the “dramatic increase” in incarceration rates for African-
American males was caused by changes to crack cocaine sentencing laws). 
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“have failed miserably in court.”109  Those same statistics, however, have 
made headway with policymakers.  In 2007, the United States Sentencing 
Commission reduced the disparity between crack and powder cocaine 
penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines.110  More recently, Congress has 
acted to modify the mandatory minimums for crack offenses.  On August 3, 
2010, President Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
which changed the amounts of crack cocaine necessary to trigger five-year 
mandatory minimum sentences from five grams to twenty-eight grams, and 
for ten-year sentences from fifty grams to two hundred eighty grams.111
Racially disproportionate sentencing statistics in drug cases also led to 
reform of sentencing laws in Georgia.  In 1987, the Georgia legislature 
passed a two-strikes provision for drug offenses.
  
This amendment reduces the disparity between the quantities of powder and 
crack cocaine necessary to trigger mandatory minimum sentences from 
100:1 to 18:1.  And this change indisputably was the result of evidence that 
the crack cocaine sentences were disproportionately affecting low-income 
minority defendants. 
112  Under that provision, a 
defendant convicted of a “second or subsequent” drug trafficking offense 
was subject to a mandatory minimum life sentence if the state notified the 
defendant prior to trial of its intent to seek the enhanced penalty.113  By 
May 1994, the state Board of Pardon and Parole’s records indicated that 
98.4% of the defendants “serving life sentences for drug offenses . . . were 
African-American, although African-Americans comprise only 27% of the 
state’s population.”114
In Stephens v. State, an African-American defendant sentenced to life 
under the repeat offender provision used those statewide statistics, in 
conjunction with evidence that all of the defendants serving life sentences 
under that provision in Hall County (where Stephens was convicted) were 
African-American, to argue that the statute was being enforced in a 
discriminatory manner in violation of the equal protection guarantees of 
both the United States Constitution and the Georgia constitution.  Over a 
strong dissent, a majority of the court concluded that Stephens had failed to 
 
 
109 See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1298.  Defendants have challenged the Act itself as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, id., and also have brought selective prosecution 
claims against the government for the enforcement of the statute.  See United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
110 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 70 
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/may2007rf.pdf. 
111 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
112 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-30(d) (West 2009 & West Supp. 2010) (repealed).  
113 See Mays v. State, 414 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 1992). 
114 Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 561 (Ga. 1995). 
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establish an equal protection violation because he had not identified a 
similarly situated white person in Hall County who could have been 
prosecuted under the two-strikes law but was not.115  The dissent found 
Stephens’ statistical showing—establishing that an African-American 
defendant in Georgia convicted of two or more drug offenses was 2,761% 
more likely to receive a life sentence than a white defendant in Georgia 
convicted of two or more drug offenses—sufficiently “stark” to require the 
government, under a modified Batson framework, to provide a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to prosecute Stephens under the 
repeat offender law.116
Although Stephens failed to prevail in court, his case provided the 
foundation for a change in the repeat offender law.  Five months after the 
case was decided, the Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial and 
Ethnic Bias in the Court System issued a report citing the statistics set forth 
in Stephens, and calling for a more detailed study broken down by judicial 
circuit on the use of the repeat offender law.
 
117  Faced with these bleak 
statistics, and the possibility of future successful equal protection 
challenges if circuit-specific statistics were kept, the Georgia legislature 
repealed the mandatory life sentence in two-strikes cases.118
As these examples illustrate, data demonstrating unequal enforcement 
of the laws, even in the absence of a finding that there has been a 
constitutional violation, may lead to legislative reform.  Thus, data 
collection remains of critical importance to ensure that laws are enforced 
fairly. 
 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 568–69 (Benham, P.J., dissenting).  When the slip opinion in the case was first 
released, a majority of the Court concluded that the statistics presented by the defense were 
“so grossly disproportionate . . . as to shock the conscience,” and therefore required the 
Government to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its conduct.  See Stephens 
v. State, No. S94A1854, 1995 WL 116292 (Ga. Mar. 17, 1995), withdrawn, 456 S.E.2d 560 
(Ga. 1995).  The court’s slip opinion caused great consternation and prompted a scathing 
letter from district attorneys across the state.  See James P. Fleissner, Criminal Law and 
Procedure: A Two-Year Survey, 48 MERCER L. REV. 219, 222 (1996).  Less than two weeks 
later, the court vacated the slip opinion and issued a new majority opinion concluding that 
there was no violation of either the state or the federal Constitution.  Justice Thompson, who 
switched his vote between the two opinions, authored a concurring opinion noting that 
although there was no constitutional violation, “only a true cynic can look at these statistics 
and not be impressed that something is amiss.”  Stephens, 456 S.E. 2d at 564 (Thompson, J., 
concurring specially).  He therefore urged the Georgia legislature to step in and address the 
problem.  Id. at 565–66. 
117 See Fleissner, supra note 116, at 230. 
118 Id. at 224. 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA ON ECONOMIC STATUS OF DEFENDANTS 
Among the various categories of data that can be kept on criminal 
defendants, data regarding the economic status119 of the defendant may be 
one of the most important to collect and analyze.  This is true because the 
data we have demonstrate that criminal defendants are disproportionately 
poor.120
A. DATA CURRENTLY BEING COLLECTED ON ECONOMIC STATUS OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
  Thus, the development of rational and effective criminal justice 
policy requires both that we study this data to determine what programs 
might be most effective and that we collect additional data that might 
provide clues as to why poor people are so overrepresented in the criminal 
justice system.  In addition, in order to assure that laws are not being 
applied discriminatorily against poor people, we need to analyze the data 
we have and collect more complete data on those defendants.  Before 
turning to how data on income levels can be used, this Part explores the 
limited data we currently have on the economic status (broadly defined) of 
criminal defendants. 
Accurately estimating the income levels of individuals in the criminal 
justice system presents challenges.  As of now, no complete data are being 
systematically collected on the income levels of all criminal defendants in 
either the state or federal courts.  Neither the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
database on criminal defendants in federal court121 nor its database on 
felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five largest counties122
 
119 For purposes of this Article, I use economic status, defined primarily by income level, 
rather than the more robust concept of socioeconomic status, which can encompass many 
other factors including occupation, education, and housing tenure.  See Albert F. Osborn, 
Assessing the Socio-Economic Status of Families, 21 SOCIOLOGY 429 (1987).  Collecting 
complete data on socioeconomic status of criminal defendants may provide a more accurate 
picture than economic status data alone, but collecting economic status data is a necessary 
first step.  Accordingly, this Article primarily addresses the arguments for collecting 
economic status data. 
 
120 See infra Part III.A. 
121 See FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS RES. CTR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA 
DICTIONARY FOR DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED, http://fjsrc.urban.org/ 
datadictionary.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (describing all of the data variables collected 
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).  
122 INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC. RESEARCH, VARIABLES FOR STATE 
COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS SERIES, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/ 
series/00079 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (follow “List all variables in this series” hyperlink) 
(listing the data variables collected for the State Court Processing Statistics Series). 
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collects data on the income level of criminal defendants.  It also appears 
that no state currently collects this data.123
Although complete data do not exist in any jurisdiction, we do have 
some information regarding the economic status of some actors within the 
criminal justice system.  First, we have survey data documenting pre-arrest 
income levels for a sample of inmates in correctional facilities.  Second, we 
have information regarding rates of appointment of counsel in felony cases 
in federal court and in state courts in the largest counties.  Finally, we have 
data on educational levels of inmates in some state prisons and of 
defendants convicted in federal court.  As discussed below, each of these 
datasets has limitations and jurisdictions ought to be collecting more 
complete data, but these sources provide at least some information related 
to economic status. 
 
Beginning with data on income levels of incarcerated defendants, the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics collects data on pre-arrest income levels in a 
survey it administers to a sample of prisoners in state and federal prisons 
and inmates in local jails.  As discussed in Part III.B., infra, one problem 
with this dataset is that the data on income level collected in these surveys 
have not been comprehensively analyzed, but the data are being collected.  
Every five to seven years, the Bureau of Justice Statistics conducts a survey 
of a sample of inmates in state and federal prisons, and that survey includes 
a question regarding the prisoner’s income level in the month prior to 
arrest.124  In 2004, approximately thirty-three percent of surveyed inmates 
in state prisons reported that they had earned less than $800 in the month 
preceding their arrest.125  That income would have put all of them at or 
below the 2004 poverty threshold for a single person.126  Because some 
percentage of the prisoners reporting higher monthly incomes very likely 
had dependents,127
 
123 As discussed in Part IV, infra, Arkansas may start collecting this data, but at least as 
of right now, it is not available. 
 moreover, using $800 as the relevant cutoff probably 
124 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CODEBOOK FOR THE 
SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 611–12 (2004), 
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/archive2?study=4572&path= 
NACJD&docsonly=yes (login and password required) [hereinafter BJS STATE AND FEDERAL 
SURVEY].  The surveys were done in 1991, 1997, and 2004. 
125 See id.  The survey directs respondents to include income from both legal and illegal 
sources. 
126 The U.S. Census Bureau sets the poverty threshold for single people and families, and 
it collects data on how many people in the United States fall below that threshold.  In 2004, 
the poverty threshold for a single person was $9,645.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 
THRESHOLDS (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/ 
threshld/thresh04.html. 
127 There are a number of survey questions regarding the number of children the inmate 
has and the number of people in the inmate’s household pre-arrest, and there also is a 
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excludes a number of prisoners who were under the poverty threshold.128  In 
2004, approximately eleven percent of adults between the ages of eighteen 
and sixty-four were in a household that was under the poverty threshold.129  
Thus, those below the poverty threshold were three times more likely to be 
incarcerated in a state prison than the average person, and were four times 
more likely than those above the poverty threshold.130
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also conducts a survey of jail inmates 
that includes a question about monthly income prior to arrest,
 
131 and the 
statistics from the jail survey are even more striking.  In the 2002 survey, 
forty-seven percent of inmates reported that they earned less than $800 in 
the month before their arrest.132  Those below the poverty threshold 
therefore were more than four times more likely to be jailed than the 
average person, and seven times more likely than those above the poverty 
threshold.133
 
question regarding whether the inmate was the primary financial support for any children 
prior to arrest.  See BJS STATE AND FEDERAL SURVEY, supra note 
 
124, at 594–603.  The 
difficulty is that the survey does not ask how many children were financially dependent on 
the inmate, whether any other household members (for instance spouses or parent) were 
financially dependent on the inmate, or whether the household had any other source of 
income.  Thus, it is impossible to ascertain the percentage of inmates falling below the 
poverty threshold. 
128 The poverty thresholds vary depending on the size of the family and the ages of the 
members of the household.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOW THE CENSUS BUREAU MEASURES 
POVERTY (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/about/overview/ 
measure.html. 
129 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and Unrelated 
Individuals Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race: 2003—Below 100% of Poverty—
All Races, in CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 2004 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
SUPPLEMENT (2004), available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032004/pov/ 
new01_100_01.htm.  I use the census figures for adults age eighteen to sixty-four because 
the correctional population figures capture adult inmates, and the vast majority of adult 
inmates are over the age of eighteen and under the age of sixty-five. 
130 Because the 11% of the population that is poor contributes 33% of the prison 
population, a poor person’s chance of going to prison is three times greater than the average 
person.  By contrast, because the 89% of the population that is not poor constitutes only 67% 
of the prison population, a non-poor person’s risk of going to prison is less than the average 
person’s by a factor of 0.75:1.  Thus, a poor person is four times (3/.75) more likely to be 
imprisoned than a non-poor person. 
131 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CODEBOOK FOR THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN 
LOCAL JAILS, 2002 (2006), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/bob/ 
archive2?study=4359&path=NACJD&docsonly=yes.  
132 The jail survey includes both inmates who have been convicted and sentenced to a jail 
term and pretrial defendants who are being detained pending trial.  Because indigent 
defendants are less likely to be able to post bond and therefore are more likely to be detained 
pending trial, the sample of jail inmates may be poorer than criminal defendants generally. 
133 Because the 11% of the population that is poor contributes 47% of the jail population, 
a poor person’s chance of going to jail is 4.3 (47/11) times greater than the average person.  
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Although the data collected in these surveys provide a useful starting 
point, they are marked by two significant limitations.  First, they reflect 
only the income levels of defendants who were either convicted and 
sentenced to prison or held in a local jail.  As a result, the dataset excludes 
all defendants who were not incarcerated.  Second, because the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics collects these data nationally, the data provide no 
information on the income levels of defendants on a state-by-state basis.134
Data on income levels of defendants therefore are sparse, but there are 
a couple of proxies that can be used to estimate the economic status of 
criminal defendants.  Each of these proxies has limitations.  They leave no 
doubt, however, that the criminal justice system prosecutes and incarcerates 
poor people at a much higher rate than non-poor people. 
 
First, appointment of counsel serves as a proxy for indigence.  Since 
1963 when the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, the 
Constitution has required that states appoint counsel to defendants who are 
“too poor to hire a lawyer.”135  In 2004, appointed counsel represented 
seventy-eight percent of felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five 
largest counties.136
The data on appointment of counsel have the advantage of capturing 
the status of all criminal defendants who are prosecuted, not just those who 
are convicted and sentenced to incarceration.  Nonetheless, the data have 
several limitations.  The most significant of these is that the standard for 
  The fact that appointed counsel represented these 
defendants means that someone made a determination that these defendants 
could not afford counsel. 
 
By contrast, because the 89% of the population that is not poor constitutes only 53% of the 
jail population, a non-poor person’s risk of going to prison is less than the average person’s 
by a factor of 0.6:1.  Thus, a poor person is seven times (4.3/.6) more likely to be jailed than 
a non-poor person. 
134 Because of the way the sample for the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey was done, 
“[s]tate, local, or other subnational estimates cannot be made.”  Id. at 8. 
 As discussed below, see infra Part III.B, data regarding defendant demographics broken 
down by state are particularly important both to the development of policy, which primarily 
happens at the state level, and to ensuring that prosecutions, the majority of which happen in 
state courts, are conducted fairly. 
135 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants being prosecuted in state court 
have a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel).  At the time Gideon was decided, the 
vast majority of states already provided counsel to indigent defendants charged with 
felonies, but Gideon made clear that the right to counsel applied to all defendants charged 
with felonies in state courts.  Id. at 345.  Since Gideon, the Court has held that the right to 
counsel also applies in any case in which the court either imposes a sentence of 
imprisonment, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), or suspends incarceration, see 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
136 This statistic comes from an analysis of data collected by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics as part of the State Court Processing Statistics Series, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR20281.  
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appointment of counsel varies widely among jurisdictions,137 and 
appointment of counsel therefore means different things in different places.  
For instance, in Georgia, there is a presumption that felony defendants are 
entitled to appointment of counsel if they earn less than 150% of the federal 
poverty guidelines,138 and a presumption that they are ineligible for 
appointment of counsel if they earn over 150% of the federal poverty 
guidelines.139  Similarly, in Washington state, the statute provides very 
specific guidelines for determining indigency, and counsel is generally 
provided only if the defendant makes less than 125% of the federal poverty 
guidelines.140
In Alabama, by contrast, the statute establishes no income-based rules 
or presumptions of any kind; instead the court must examine a broad array 
of factors, including the net income of the defendant, the extent and 
liquidity of assets, and the projected length and complexity of the legal 
proceedings in determining whether the defendant qualifies for appointed 
counsel.
 
141  In Arkansas, courts have likewise emphasized that 
determinations of indigence should be made on a case-by-case basis.142  
Because there is no uniform standard for determining eligibility for 
appointed counsel, it is difficult to make any assessment regarding the 
income levels of those who use appointed counsel.143
There is a second problem with using appointment of counsel as a 
proxy for determining the income level of criminal defendants: our data are 
limited to federal defendants and state felony defendants in forty of the 
seventy-five largest counties.  We have complete data on appointment rates 
 
 
137 See Adam Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L. REV. 571, 572 
(2005).  The Supreme Court has never provided any guidance regarding how states should 
determine whether a person is indigent for purposes of the constitutional right to counsel, 
and jurisdictions therefore have adopted very different standards governing the inquiry.  See 
id. at 572 (“In the forty years since Gideon was decided, there has not been a single Supreme 
Court case defining what makes a criminal defendant poor enough to be entitled to appointed 
counsel.”). 
138 The 2009 federal poverty guideline for a single person is $10,830, and for a family of 
four is $22,050.  See ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2009 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES (2010), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml. 
139 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-8(b) (West 2009). 
140 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.010(1) (West 2002 & West Supp. 2010); WASH. 
STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., UPDATE ON CRITERIA AND STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING AND 
VERIFYING INDIGENCY 7 (2007), available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/Reports/ 
Other Reports/080228 10-22-07 Indigency Report - revised.pdf. 
141 See ALA. CODE § 15-12-1 (1995). 
142 See Hill v. State, 805 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1991). 
143 In most jurisdictions, defendants are required either to file some sort of an affidavit in 
order to establish their indigence or to respond to questions posed by the court on the 
subject.  See Gershowitz, supra note 137, at 580. 
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in all federal cases, and data exist with regard to appointment rates for a 
sample of defendants in state felony cases in the seventy-five largest 
counties,144 but beyond this, no useful data exist.  Thus, there is no 
information with regard to appointment rates in state felony cases in rural 
areas.  Nor is there information on appointment rates for defendants in 
suburban counties, even though it is far from clear that the appointment 
rates in suburban counties even loosely track those rates in more urban 
settings.145  There is, moreover, no data of any sort regarding appointment 
of counsel in state misdemeanor cases, despite the fact that appointment of 
counsel in felony cases may well differ from the appointment rate in 
misdemeanor cases.146
Finally, using appointment of counsel as a proxy for the income level 
of defendants may be misleading because some defendants become indigent 
and eligible for the appointment of counsel precisely because they are 
charged with a criminal offense.  If a defendant is held without bail pending 
trial (or is held because he cannot afford bail) then he very likely will lose 
his employment.  Unless such a defendant has saved money or has some 
assets, he will be unable to afford counsel and likely will be found eligible 
for court-appointed counsel.  These “post-arrest indigents,” however, stand 
in very different shoes from “pre-arrest indigents,” primarily because the 
former group is indigent only as a result of the fact that the criminal justice 
system itself has removed them from self-sufficiency and gainful 
employment. 
 
Despite these complexities, it remains significant that available data 
indicate that almost eighty percent of felony defendants in state courts in 
the seventy-five largest counties have court-appointed representation.  
Using incomes of less than 150% of the federal poverty guidelines as a 
benchmark for appointment of counsel,147
 
144 See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 4 (2004), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (describing collection of data for 
database).  
 in 2008, nineteen percent of 
Americans between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four were part of a 
145 Of course, some urban counties include suburbs within the county limits.  For 
instance, Cook County, Illinois, includes Northbrook, IL, with a median household income 
of $95,665, Wilmette, IL, with a median income of $106,773, and the city of Chicago, with a 
median income of $38,625.  See RECORD INFO. SERVS., COOK COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES AND 
DEMOGRAPHICS (2010), available at http://www.public-record.com/content/municipalities/ 
cook/index.asp. 
146 See Erica Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 461, 489–90 (2007) (reporting that in federal court, of defendants for whom type of 
counsel was reported, only twenty-five percent had appointed counsel). 
147 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-8(b) (West 2003 & West Supp. 2010). 
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household that made less than that amount.148  In other words, less than a 
fifth of the population was charged with seventy-eight percent of the 
felonies in criminal cases across the country.  If one calculates the risk of 
being charged with a crime, those with incomes of less than 150% of the 
federal poverty guidelines have a risk of being charged with a felony about 
four times greater than the average person and about fifteen times greater 
than the risk for those above the 150% marker.149
Educational level provides another rough proxy for economic status.  
Unfortunately, with the exception of the Massachusetts Department of 
Correction and the South Carolina Department of Corrections, state systems 
do not publish data on the educational level of criminal defendants.
 
150  In 
the federal system, the United States Sentencing Commission collects data 
on the education level of defendants convicted in federal court.  According 
to that data, in 2006, 48.9% of convicted offenders had less than a high 
school diploma.151  By contrast, the Census Bureau reported that in April 
2000, only twenty percent of the overall United States population lacked a 
high school degree.152  Again, however, the usefulness of these data is 
somewhat limited.153
 
148 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POV01: Age and Sex of All People, Family Members and 
Unrelated Individuals Iterated by Income-to-Poverty Ratio and Race: 2008, in CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY: 2009 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (2009), available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/pov/new01_150_01.htm.  In 1996, 
the rate was 23.5%.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY tbl.2 (1996), 
available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/031996/pov/2_001.htm. 
  First, and most obviously, education level correlates 
149 Seventy-eight percent of the cases involved the 19% of the population below the 
150% marker; thus the chance of a person under that marker being charged with a felony 
was a little over four times (78/19) greater than the risk for an average person.  By contrast, 
the risk that a person over that marker would be charged with a felony was almost four times 
less likely than an average person to be charged with a felony (22/81 or .27).  As a result, the 
chance of a person below the marker being charged with a felony is fifteen times greater 
(4.1/.27) than the risk for a person above the marker. 
150 The Massachusetts Department of Correction data shows that in 2009, 66% of the 
DOC population reported completing eleventh grade or less.  See MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., 
JANUARY 1, 2009 INMATE STATISTICS v (2009), http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/ 
research_reports/Jan_1_population/112009.pdf [hereinafter MASS. 2009 INMATE STATISTICS].  
Similarly, in 2009, 58% of South Carolina inmates reported that they did not have either a 
high school diploma or a GED.  See S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., PROFILE OF INMATES IN 
INSTITUTIONAL COUNT AS OF JUNE 30, 2009, at 1 (2009), http://www.doc.sc.gov/ 
research/InmatePopulationStats/ASOF_InstitutionalCount Profile_FY09.pdf. 
151 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006 tbl.4.4 (2006), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006]. 
152 See KURT J. BAUMAN & NIKKI L. GRAF, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 2000, at 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-24.pdf. 
153 The same Bureau of Justice Statistics survey that captures data on the income level of 
inmates in federal and state prisons and in local jails, see BJS STATE AND FEDERAL SURVEY, 
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only in a general way with income level.  Second, patterns shown in federal 
cases may tell us little about what occurs in state systems.  Indeed, the 
federal data may well overestimate the education level of inmates as a 
whole, because the statistics from Massachusetts indicate that sixty-six 
percent of their inmates,154
We have, then, sufficient data to establish that low-income people 
constitute a disproportionate percentage of criminal defendants.  Based on 
this data, however, we do not—and cannot—know how disproportionate 
that percentage is in general in the state system or in individual states.  And 
without any data as to the level of disproportionality, it is particularly 
difficult to examine the reasons why any level of disproportion exists. 
 as opposed to forty-nine percent of federal 
inmates, have less than a high school diploma.  Finally, because federal data 
are collected only by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, we have no data on 
the educational level of defendants who are not convicted. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING AND CONSIDERING DATA ON 
INCOME LEVEL OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
Just as collecting data on the race, mental health status, and drug 
addiction of criminal defendants has been important for the implementation 
of rational criminal justice policy and for ensuring that laws are enforced in 
an evenhanded way, data collection on income levels of criminal defendants 
is of paramount importance.  In order to develop the most successful and 
cost-effective solutions for the crime problems we face, we need to target 
criminal justice programs towards the people most likely to be defendants.  
Based on the data we have, the overrepresentation of poor people exceeds 
the overrepresentation of any other definable group with the exception of 
drug-dependent and mentally ill defendants.155
 
supra note 
  At least some crime-
reduction programs therefore need to be targeted towards poor people.  
Policymakers, however, have all but ignored the data that exist on the 
124, also collects data on the educational level of the inmates in those 
institutions.  Those data, however, are subject to the same limitations as the data for the 
income levels and therefore are not discussed separately here. 
154 See MASS. 2009 INMATE STATISTICS, supra note 150, at v. 
155 For instance, African Americans are significantly overrepresented in the prison 
population.  In 2008, approximately 33% of inmates in state and federal prison were African-
American.  See WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER C. WEST, & MATTHEW COOPER, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008, at 2 tbl.1 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1763.  That same year, approximately 
fourteen percent of the American population was African-American.  Thus, African 
Americans were approximately three times more likely to be prisoners than non-African 
Americans.  While that ratio is high, the overrepresentation of poor people is even higher, 
with poor people being more than four times more likely to be in state prison than non-poor 
people.  See supra Part III.A.  
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overrepresentation of poor people and have not called for the collection of 
any additional data.156
1. Using Data on Economic Status to Develop Rational  
Criminal Justice Policy 
  Thus, the data we currently have on the economic 
status of defendants and the income levels of prisoners need to be carefully 
analyzed, and we need to collect additional data to fill the gaps in the data. 
Low-income people constitute a large percentage of those prosecuted 
and incarcerated in the criminal justice system.  That fact suggests that 
criminal justice policymakers should focus on solutions targeted 
specifically at those who are poor.  Unfortunately, with one possible 
exception discussed below,157
The existing databases compile a wealth of survey data on inmates in 
state and federal prisons and in local jails, and provide some data on the 
cases of felony defendants represented by court-appointed counsel.  The 
problem is that although the raw data are available online, the assembled 
information cannot speak for itself; the data need to be analyzed before we 
can get any information about the economic status of defendants.  
Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the entity that provides most 
of the reports from data it collects, has not made information on the income 
levels of inmates from the surveys readily accessible.  Indeed, the last time 
a Bureau of Justice Statistics report included data on income levels of 
prisoners from the survey data described above dates back to the 1991 
 this has not happened.  This is so for a couple 
of reasons.  First, although some data related to economic status have been 
collected, very little analysis has been done of that raw data.  Second, most 
of the data being collected cannot be broken down by state and so is not 
particularly useful for state legislators.  Because it is at the state level that 
most of these policies and programs need to be developed, states probably 
need to begin collecting data on the income levels of defendants prosecuted 
in their courts so that they can analyze, among other things, the types of 
offenses poor defendants, as compared with wealthier defendants, are 
committing and the rates of recidivism of poor defendants as compared with 
the recidivism rates of non-poor defendants.  This section first will examine 
the ways in which the federal government should be using the existing data 
and then will turn to the ways in which states should consider collecting 
data in order to develop effective programs targeted towards low-income 
defendants. 
 
156 As discussed in Part IV, infra, Arkansas is the one exception. 
157 See infra notes 162–168 and accompanying text. 
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survey.158  Since then, the few publications with any data on income levels 
of prisoners report that information only in association with some other 
variable, making it very difficult to draw conclusions about the economic 
status of prisoners from those reports.159
Even a basic analysis of that data could lead to more involvement by 
the federal government in developing crime reduction strategies targeted 
towards low-income offenders.  As discussed above, the federal 
government played a critical role in the development of drug treatment 
courts and mental health courts.  And the federal government’s decision to 
fund those initiatives was driven in large part by the data establishing the 
extent of the criminal justice system’s problems with drug-addicted and 
mentally ill defendants.  While the government’s support of those programs 
certainly was warranted, the data make clear that the percentage of poor 
felony defendants—however the term “poor” might be defined—in state 
courts approaches that of drug-addicted defendants,
 
160 and is significantly 
higher than that of mentally ill defendants.161
Thus, there certainly are enough data for the federal government to 
support the development of state programs targeted towards low-income 
defendants in the way that it has with both drug courts and mental health 
courts.  Thus far, however, the federal government has only provided one 
set of funding designed to reduce recidivism rates by comprehensively 
addressing the needs, including in the areas of employment and education, 
of offenders reentering communities after prison terms.  Efforts to address 
prisoner reentry began with the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry 
Initiative (SVORI), a collaboration among the Departments of Justice, 
Labor, Education, Housing and Urban Development, and Health and 
Human Services to fund initiatives in the states to ease the reentry of 
 
 
158 ALLEN BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON 
INMATES, 1991, at 3 (1993), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty= 
pbdetail&iid=1073 (reporting income levels of inmates in the year before arrest). 
159 See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: 
EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 10 (2003) (reporting income data on state 
prisoners broken down by highest level of education reported by the prisoner). 
160 In 2004, 53% of state prisoners met the DSM-IV criteria for drug dependence or 
abuse.  See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 
2004, at 1 (2006). 
161 A survey of prison and jail inmates found that at midyear 2005, 24% of state prison 
inmates had a recent history of mental health problems (defined as being diagnosed by a 
mental health professional with a mental disorder, being hospitalized overnight because of a 
mental health problem, being prescribed medication, or receiving therapy from a mental 
health professional).  See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 2 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
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prisoners back into society and to prevent recidivism.162  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the development of SVORI was spurred by data documenting 
recidivism rates and barriers to successful reentry.  In 2002, SVORI 
awarded a number of three-year grants totaling $139 million to fund state 
efforts to provide comprehensive services—including drug treatment, 
educational opportunities, job training, and mental health services—to 
prisoners prior to and after their release.163  In addition to providing funding 
to the states to implement these programs, the SVORI also funded 
evaluations of the programs created by the states.164
Citing much of the data that led to the creation of SVORI—including 
that two-thirds of released state prisoners are expected to be rearrested for a 
new offense within three years of release, that 70% of prisoners function at 
the lowest literacy levels
 
165 and only 32% of state prison inmates have a 
high school diploma,166 that a significant percentage of state prisoners were 
not working prior to entry into prison,167 and that one year after release, up 
to 60% of former inmates are not employed168—Congress enacted the 
Second Chance Act of 2007: Community Safety Through Recidivism 
Prevention.169  The Act authorizes grants, administered through the 
Department of Justice, to programs providing services to prisoners that are 
designed to prevent substance abuse and to facilitate reentry into the 
community, including by providing educational, literacy, vocational, and 
job placement services while the offender is still in prison and providing 
supervision and services when the offender is released.170  The Act also 
authorizes up to $10 million per year for research on juvenile and adult 
offender reentry.171
 
162 See PAMELA K. LATTIMORE, ET AL., NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF SVORI: SERIOUS AND 
VIOLENT OFFENDER REENTRY INITIATIVE 2 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
url.cfm?ID=1000692 [hereinafter NATIONAL PORTRAIT].  
  As a result of the funding through these two programs, 
a number of jurisdictions have developed reentry programs.  Unfortunately, 
in the only evaluative study of these reentry programs, although SVORI 
163 See id. at 18.  
164 See id. at 11–13; PAMELA LATTIMORE & CHRISTY A. VISHER, THE MULTI-SITE 
EVALUATION OF THE SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENDER REENTRY INITIATIVE (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412075 [hereinafter MULTI-SITE EVALUATION].  
165 Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(b)(14), 122 Stat. 657, 660 
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
166 § 3(b)(15). 
167 § 3(b)(16). 
168 § 3(b)(18). 
169 See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(b)(5), 122 Stat. 657, 659–
60 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).  
170 § 101(1)–(2). 
171 § 245. 
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participants reported that they received services at a higher rate than non-
SVORI participants, the evidence tracking recidivism rates of participants 
in these programs shows at most only a modest decrease in recidivism as 
compared to non-participants.172
Part of the explanation for this outcome could lie in the fact that 
SVORI participants were “high-risk offenders who had extensive criminal 
and substance abuse histories, low levels of education and employment 
skills, and families and peers who were substance and criminal justice 
system involved.”
 
173  Indeed, on average, the male participants had first 
been arrested at age sixteen and had been arrested more than twelve times, 
and the female participants had first been arrested at age nineteen and had 
been arrested more than ten times.174
The only other federal program that seeks to reduce recidivism rates by 
improving the economic situation of newly released convicted felons 
provides a federal tax credit to employers who hire ex-felons within a year 
of their release from imprisonment or their conviction, whichever is later.
  Despite its lack of measurable success 
in reducing recidivism rates, the Initiative was laudable both for its efforts 
to address prisoner reentry in a comprehensive way and for its commitment 
to measuring outcomes.  SVORI was not, however, a program specifically 
designed to address the income disparity of inmates in the prisons.  Instead, 
it targeted a particularly high-risk group of serious offenders and tried to 
address all of their issues, from drug addiction to mental illness to economic 
challenges. 
175  
In theory, this tax credit should provide a significant incentive for 
employers to hire ex-felons, particularly in lower-wage jobs, that offsets 
some of the disincentive to hiring applicants with convictions on their 
records.  It is not at all clear, however, that the program is having such an 
effect.  Indeed, the government does not appear to have tried to measure the 
effect of this particular tax credit in any way,176
 
172 See MULTI-SITE EVALUATION, supra note 
 so it is difficult to even 
164, at 86 (documenting relatively minimal 
effects of SVORI program on recidivism rates over a two-year period). 
173 See id. at ES-8. 
174 Id. 
175 See 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2006). 
176 Although the Internal Revenue Service ultimately grants the tax credit, the 
Department of Labor is charged with primary operation of the program.  The only data 
available from the Department of Labor include the total number of certifications received 
for all of the groups covered under the statute.  See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Work Opportunity 
Tax Credit (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.doleta.gov/business/Incentives/opptax/ (stating that 
in fiscal year 2008, 691,421 certifications were issued by state workforce agencies).  The 
statute, however, covers a number of groups, including certain veterans, those receiving 
benefits from SSI or other designated public assistance, and certain residents of designated 
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know the extent to which employers are participating in the program.  In 
sum, the federal government’s efforts to address criminal justice system 
issues related to economic status have been both fragmented and modest. 
The states have also fallen short in efforts to take account of economic 
status in the operation of their criminal justice systems.  As discussed in 
Part III.A, very little state-specific data are currently being collected 
regarding the economic status of criminal defendants.  Perhaps as a result, 
states have done very little to focus on the problem.  Like the federal 
government, a few states have implemented programs designed to reduce 
recidivism by assisting ex-offenders with getting jobs.  For instance, Illinois 
has enacted a state tax credit similar to the federal credit,177 and several 
states have passed “Ban the Box” legislation, which bars employers from 
asking about prior convictions on job applications.178  These Ban the Box 
statutes are limited in their scope—the Minnesota and New Mexico statutes 
cover only public employers, and the Hawaii law, while purporting to cover 
all employers, exempts many employers, including the state and any of its 
branches or agencies, counties, many financial institutions, and private 
schools179—but they at least give those with prior convictions on their 
record a better opportunity to get a foot in the employment door.180
 
empowerment or enterprise zones.  See 26 U.S.C. § 51(d)(1) (2006).  Thus, it is impossible 
to assess the extent to which the program is being used specifically to benefit ex-felons. 
 
177 See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/216 (West Supp. 2010) (providing a tax credit of up 
to $600 for each qualifying ex-offender that an employer hires and defining a qualifying ex-
offender as an offender who has served time in an Illinois adult correctional center and was 
hired within one year of release from confinement). 
178 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting all employers 
from inquiring about or considering conviction records until after the potential employee has 
been given a conditional offer of employment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.021 (West 2004 & 
West Supp. 2010) (prohibiting public employers from asking potential employees about 
criminal records until after the potential employee has been selected for an interview); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (1978 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting state employers from making any 
inquiry into prior convictions on initial applications for employment and allowing 
consideration of conviction only after applicant has “been selected as a finalist for the 
position”). 
179 HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(d). 
180 The EEOC has concluded that an absolute bar on employment of any individual with 
a criminal conviction on his record violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2010). See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC 
POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html 
[hereinafter EEOC POLICY STATEMENT].  See also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d. 
1290, 1293–99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that a blanket policy of refusing employment to 
anyone with a conviction on his record had a disparate impact on African Americans and 
could not show that such policy was job-related and consistent with business necessity).  In 
deciding whether or not to hire a person with a criminal conviction on his record, the 
employer therefore, should consider three factors: (1) the nature and gravity of the offense; 
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Although programs aimed at removing the barriers to employment 
faced by ex-offenders may help reduce recidivism, given the high rates of 
poverty and low rates of education among ex-offenders, it is unlikely that 
these programs alone will have much impact on overall crime rates.  This is 
an area in which data could provide some guidance.  If the data were to 
show that first-time offenders are as likely to be poor at the time of their 
arrest as are repeat offenders, this information would suggest that the felony 
conviction is not the primary barrier to gainful employment.  Thus, states 
might find that tax incentives and Ban the Box initiatives are less effective 
means of reducing recidivism than other programs.  The question, of 
course, is what other programs might be effective. 
One possibility would involve adopting a therapeutic jurisprudence 
model court designed to divert defendants charged with certain types of 
offenses into a program that helps them find jobs and stable housing 
arrangements, while promoting their active participation in the life of the 
community.  The therapeutic jurisprudence model—which encompasses 
both drug courts and mental health courts—advocates for the law as a 
therapeutic agent that enhances the physical or psychological well-being of 
individuals.181  Drug courts, for instance, seek to use the power of the 
criminal law to enhance the psychological well-being of the participant by 
helping that person understand the nature and effects of addiction.182  If 
poverty in some way psychologically reduces the disincentive to 
committing crime—for instance, by disconnecting the person from the 
community ties that ordinarily provide an incentive to engage in lawful 
behavior—addressing those disconnections through a diversionary court 
may reduce crime rates.183
Of course, the types of offenses that should be diverted will depend on 
what the data show.  But if the data show a correlation between low income 
 
 
(2) the length of time since the potential employee’s conviction or release from confinement; 
and (3) the nature of the job sought.  See EEOC POLICY STATEMENT, supra. 
 Given this law under Title VII, the legislation passed in Minnesota, Hawaii, and New 
Mexico assists ex-offenders seeking jobs in a couple of ways.  First, the statutes prohibit 
covered employers from asking questions about prior convictions on initial job applications.  
Once an employer has made the decision to advance the application to the interview stage or 
has conditionally decided to hire the applicant, the employer has had the opportunity to 
consider the applicant without regard to his past record, making it more probable that the 
applicant will be hired even in spite of the later notification of the prior conviction.  Second, 
if the applicant’s prior conviction is not particularly related to the expected job duties of the 
position and the applicant ultimately is not hired, he has a much stronger, and more 
complete, record that the employer has violated Title VII. 
181 See WINICK & WEXLER, supra note 58, at 7–9. 
182 Id. 
183 Cf. Butler, supra note 105, at 998 (suggesting that in the hip-hop culture, prison and 
punishment have lost their stigmatic effect). 
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levels and the commission of certain offenses—for instance, shoplifting and 
petty theft—it may make sense to divert these cases so as to prevent 
recidivism by resolving the issue that led to the criminal behavior.184  Other 
offenses that correlate with income level—in particular drug distribution—
may also fit well into a therapeutic justice initiative.  In general, courts have 
been reluctant to address head-on the economic nature of drug distribution, 
instead trying to shuttle defendants into programs like drug courts that do 
not address their underlying needs.  Indeed, some critics of drug courts have 
pointed to the fact that, at least in some jurisdictions, many drug traffickers 
are being diverted into drug courts even if they show few signs of 
addiction.185  Part of the reason that these defendants are diverted into drug 
courts is that judges are reluctant to impose the sentences mandated by 
harsh drug laws, while prosecutors are unwilling to dismiss the cases 
altogether.186
In short, a rational criminal justice policy seeking to reduce crime and 
recidivism rates must recognize that a significant percentage of those who 
are charged with and convicted of crimes are poor, and it must develop 
programs to reduce criminal activity among the poor.  The development of 
those programs requires reliable data, both to justify funding and to help 
determine what programs might be most effective.  Finally, data on the 
operation of any programs are necessary so that the success of the programs 
can be measured.  Such steps will enable modification of programs to 
maximize their effectiveness and replication of effective programs. 
  The difficulty with placing non-addicted defendants into 
addiction-based drug court programs is self-evident.  The real problem is 
that many street-level drug dealers come from impoverished backgrounds, 
and selling drugs offers a quick way to make significant amounts of money.  
Helping those defendants find and take advantage of legal work options is 
much more likely to reduce recidivism than providing them with addiction 
counseling that they do not need. 
 
184 These types of crimes are not as serious as those that were included within the SVORI 
study.  See NATIONAL PORTRAIT, supra note 162.  The severity of the charged offense may 
well be one factor that states would want to consider in determining what offenses the 
alternative court would encompass. 
185 See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 794–98 
(2008) (noting that 95% of the drug court participants in the Bronx Drug Court and 90% of 
the defendants in the Brooklyn drug court are charged with drug dealing, rather than drug 
possession).  
186 Id. 
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2. The Importance of Data on Economic Status for  
Ensuring Equal Treatment 
Data on the income levels of defendants also provide a means of 
determining whether our laws are being enforced equally, without regard to 
either race or class.  The data we currently have demonstrates that poor 
people are disproportionately represented among those prosecuted in 
criminal cases.187
Before turning to the types of data we need to have in order to properly 
assess this issue, a word on the remedy for unequal enforcement of statutes 
against poor people is in order.  To date, the Supreme Court has never held 
that socioeconomic class is a protected class for purposes of analyzing 
equal protection claims.  Presumably, then, even if there were data 
establishing discriminatory enforcement, a low-income defendant might 
well have no cognizable selective prosecution claim.  At the least, then, the 
collection of data on economic status will provide less help in asserting 
selective prosecution claims than similar data based on race or sex. 
  Without proper data, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
this overrepresentation is attributable to a higher rate of committing crimes 
among poor people or to unequal enforcement of the criminal laws. 
That fact notwithstanding, data on economic status still are critical to 
preventing unequal enforcement of statutes against lower-income 
defendants.  As discussed above, the constitutional remedy for selective 
prosecution of racial minorities has provided virtually no relief for 
individual defendants.188
The data on education levels of defendants gives at least some reason 
to question whether the government enforces criminal laws equally across 
economic classes.  In federal court, only 30.5% of those with less than a 
high school diploma were released prior to trial, while 77% of defendants 
with a college degree were released.
  Even in the absence of constitutional claims, 
however, data on the unequal enforcement of statutes can and sometimes 
does lead to legislative reform. 
189  Because the Bail Reform Act 
prohibits judicial officers from “impos[ing] a financial condition that results 
in the pretrial detention of a person,”190
 
187 See supra Part III.A.  Because our data are incomplete, we do not know the extent to 
which poor people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, but it is safe to say that 
there is at least some overrepresentation. 
 the ability to post bail should not 
account for this difference.  Of course, it could be that the nature of the 
crime charged varies with the educational background of the defendant.  
But these data should give us pause. 
188 See supra Part II.B. 
189 See FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006, supra note 151, at tbl.3.2. 
190 See 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(2) (2006). 
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For lower-level offenses, the effect of poverty may be most apparent.  
As discussed above, inmates in local jails are significantly poorer than 
inmates in state and federal prisons.191  That could mean one of two things: 
Either poor people commit a greater percentage of low-level crimes than 
more serious offenses, or poor people are more likely to be sentenced to 
incarceration for relatively minor offenses than wealthier people.192
Finally, data might show significant income disparities among those 
charged with particular offenses, while also demonstrating that rates of 
offending do not explain the disparity.  If so, there is a strong basis for 
concluding that over-enforcement of certain criminal laws in low-income 
areas is occurring.  Enforcement of drug possession laws provides a rich 
area for study along these lines, at least in part because the federal 
government has some data on the profiles of drug users.  If the data 
establish that poor people are significantly overrepresented among those 
prosecuted under statutes outlawing controlled substance possession, one 
would then want to turn to the extent to which drug use is primarily a low-
income issue.  According to a report prepared by the federal government in 
2002, current illicit drug use is somewhat higher among adults with less 
than a high school education (7.6%) than adults with a college education 
(4.3%).
  The 
only way to determine which of the reasons results in the disparity is to 
examine data on offense levels and sentencing, as well as data on the 
convictions of poor people in local jails.  If the data support the latter 
explanation, then jurisdictions may well want to examine sentencing 
practices for misdemeanor and low-level felony offenses to promote fair 
and nondiscriminatory sentencing. 
193  But adults with a college education also were more likely to 
have used drugs in their lifetimes (47.2%) than adults who had not 
completed high school (32%).194
 
191 See supra Part III.A.  In general, those incarcerated in local jails have been convicted 
of lower level offenses than those sentenced to prison. 
  Those facts suggest that while drug use 
may be occurring at slightly higher rates in low-income areas than in 
wealthier neighborhoods, drug use is prevalent across the country.  Thus, if 
low-income people are being prosecuted or are incarcerated or both for drug 
possession at overwhelmingly higher rates than non-poor people, there may 
192 For more serious crimes, the sentencing guidelines now in operation in many states 
have mitigated some of the differences in sentencing based on socioeconomic class.  See 
Frase, supra note 21, at 177 (noting that evaluations have indicated that Minnesota’s 
sentencing guidelines have “largely . . . eliminated” race, gender, and class biases as “direct 
causes of sentencing disparity”). 
193 See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2001 
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 20 (2002), available at 
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k1nhsda/vol1/toc.htm. 
194 Id. 
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be issues with unequal enforcement of the drug laws.  Again, however, 
without the collection and analysis of data on the economic status of 
defendants in the criminal justice system, we cannot know whether unequal 
enforcement is occurring. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Rational criminal justice policy and assurances of equal enforcement 
of laws both require the collection and analysis of data on the economic 
status of criminal defendants.  In particular, researchers should collect and 
analyze economic status data on defendants in a database that also includes, 
at the very least, the charges against the defendant, sentencing data, and 
criminal history. 
Much of this data already exists for prisoners in state and federal 
prisons and inmates in local jails.195
If poor people are convicted of the same types of crimes as non-poor 
people and are just generally overrepresented among all types of crimes, the 
policy responses may well differ because the overrepresentation of poor 
people may result from a factor other than economic need.  Regardless what 
the data show about the breakdown of offenses, any analysis should try to 
ascertain whether the overrepresentation of poor people in the system is the 
result of discrimination against the poor or the result of a higher rate of 
offending.  For at least some crimes, we have rough data regarding the 
demographic profile of those who engage in criminal behavior.
  But the existing data need to be 
analyzed much more thoroughly.  As an initial matter, we need to determine 
exactly what percentage of the inmate population is poor.  That may require 
more detailed analysis, not just of the pre-arrest monthly income of each 
inmate but also of the number of dependents and the household income.  
Data also should be parsed to determine what types of crimes poor people 
commit and whether the breakdown of those crimes mirrors the types of 
crimes committed by non-poor defendants.  If poor people are convicted of 
different crimes than non-poor people, more research needs to be done to 
determine why that is the case so that policy proposals can incorporate that 
data. 
196
 
195 See supra Part III.A.  
  If that 
profile differs significantly from the profile of those who are imprisoned for 
those offenses, lawmakers may need to examine the ways in which those 
laws are being enforced at the arrest level, prosecution level, and trial level.  
Recidivism rates also provide fertile ground for analysis to assist 
policymakers.  In particular, it would be helpful to know whether repeat 
196 See, e.g., supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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offenders are more likely to be poor than first offenders, and if so, the 
magnitude of that difference. 
A key purpose of collecting data of this kind is to spur the 
development of programs that address in a nuanced way the issue of the 
overrepresentation of low-income people in the criminal justice system.  
Most of these programs will be implemented, if at all, at the state level.  Yet 
existing datasets—provided primarily by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
survey data—give us only a broad nationwide overview.  This is the case 
even though the profile of poor people in different states varies greatly, 
depending on, among other things, whether the state is predominately rural 
or urban.  In addition, the substantive criminal laws and sentencing 
provisions, as well as enforcement strategies, differ significantly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
For all of these reasons, states need to collect and analyze their own 
data so that they can develop programs adapted to their local conditions.  
There are, of course, challenges to collecting these data, particularly at the 
pretrial stage of the case.  Once the defendant has been convicted and 
sentenced, data collection is less complicated, since prisons and jails in 
many jurisdictions already gather a great deal of information from inmates.  
In particular, in order to determine the appropriate security level for 
inmates, many correctional facilities secure information regarding the 
inmate’s criminal history, the charges on which he was convicted, and the 
economic background of the inmate, including educational level.197  None 
of these data, however, are available in a usable form, either because the 
state has not compiled the information into a database or because it has not 
made the database available.  As discussed above, Massachusetts and South 
Carolina are the only jurisdictions that collect and make available data on 
the educational background of inmates, along with criminal history and 
other relevant data.198  States need to establish systems for compiling the 
information they collect into a single database that can be analyzed to 
provide more useful information to policymakers.199
Collection of data from criminal defendants who have been charged 
but not convicted presents additional challenges.  First, to the extent that 
any of the information is incriminating, criminal defendants may have a 
 
 
197 See, e.g., Assigning Inmates to Prison, N.C. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/DOP/custody.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (noting that in order 
to determine security classifications, “[p]rison classification specialists develop an individual 
profile of each inmate that includes the offender’s crime, social background, education, job 
skills and work history, health, and criminal record, including prior prison sentences”). 
198 See supra Part III.A. 
199 Grants from the Bureau of Justice Assistance could prove critical to the ability of 
states to undertake this task. 
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Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide it.200
States also must determine who should be responsible for collecting 
data from pretrial defendants.  At the pretrial stage, a number of different 
institutional actors interact with defendants, including police officers, 
prosecutors, courts, and defense lawyers, but pretrial services agencies may 
be the most logical choice to collect these data.  In many jurisdictions, 
pretrial services agencies collect information from defendants in order to 
assist the judge in deciding whether to release the defendant prior to trial,
  For instance, if a 
defendant has been earning income through illegal means and is charged for 
that illegal conduct, requiring her to report her income may tend to 
incriminate her.  One solution might be to permit pretrial defendants to 
refuse to answer questions that might incriminate them.  Although creating 
such an exemption will result in missing data, the exemption should apply 
to only a small percentage of defendants and the datasets likely still will be 
large. 
201 
and that information often includes, among other things, defendants’ 
employment history.202
Other potential sources for data on pretrial defendants are the court 
system itself and public defender offices.  As discussed above, the rules for 
determining eligibility for court-appointed counsel vary by jurisdiction,
  In jurisdictions that rely heavily on pretrial service 
agency reports, the gathering of data by these agencies makes sense.  Of 
course, these data would not include the end result of the case—that is, 
whether the defendant was convicted and, if so, the sentence imposed.  
Nonetheless, these data would provide a very helpful profile of those 
charged in the criminal justice system. 
203
 
200 See Gould, supra note 
 
but in every jurisdiction, either someone within the court system or 
someone from the public defender’s office collects information from all 
88, at 324–25 (discussing Minnesota’s efforts to collect data on 
race of criminal defendants through a pretrial survey process and noting that the surveys 
have been deemed “voluntary” in part because of concerns that such information might 
incriminate the defendant, making any requirement that the defendant complete the survey a 
potential Fifth Amendment violation). 
201 See, e.g., JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY 
OF PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 13 (2003), available at http://www.napsa.org/ 
publications/prog21stcent.pdf (noting that in most jurisdictions, pretrial services officers 
provide judges with verified information on the defendant to be used in making a bail 
determination, including the residence and employment status, criminal history, mental 
health status, and status of drug addiction). 
202 See, e.g., MARIE VAN NOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
VIRGINIA: THE VIRGINIA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/corrections/riskAssessment/assessingRisk.pdf (identifying 
employment history as a significant predictive factor for pretrial risk assessment). 
203 See supra Part III.A. 
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defendants seeking court-appointed counsel, including the charges they are 
facing, employment status, and income level.  To be sure, this information 
is not collected from those who retain counsel, so any database compiled 
from these data would be incomplete.  It would, however, provide some 
information regarding the income levels of defendants who have appointed 
counsel, and if this information were collected and maintained by the court, 
it could be part of a database that also includes the outcomes of cases. 
The one other stage at which data are collected is at sentencing, 
particularly in jurisdictions that have sentencing commissions.  In at least 
some of these jurisdictions, the sentencing commission is specifically 
charged with collecting and analyzing data about defendants, the crimes 
they committed, and the sentences they receive.204
The critical point is that states need to make data collection a priority, 
designating specific actors to collect and compile data on defendants and 
then funding efforts to do so.  Once the data have been collected, there are a 
number of entities—including the Bureau of Justice Statistics, academics, 
and non-profit organizations—that can assist with analyzing the data so that 
policymakers have the critical information they need to create programs that 
will reduce crime. 
  In such states, it would 
impose little added burden to also require the collection and compilation of 
data on the education level of the defendant, pre-arrest income level, and 
number of dependents. 
It appears that Arkansas is already on the path to developing just such 
a plan for the collection and analysis of data.  In 2009, the state enacted 
legislation creating a Criminal Justice Task Force, which was charged with 
examining information about crime victims and criminal defendants, 
including information about their age, gender, race, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status.205  The legislature directed the task force to 
determine, among other things, the effectiveness of current criminal 
penalties in deterring future crime,206 the cost of sentences,207 and the risk 
that criminal laws are being administered unequally based on the race, 
gender, age, or socioeconomic status of either the defendant or the 
victim.208
 
204 See, e.g., Frase, supra note 
  The legislation also directs the task force to “[d]etermine the 
adequacy of current data systems to record and retrieve data that will enable 
ongoing monitoring of the criminal justice system to determine if it is 
26, at 279 (discussing the Minnesota Sentencing 
Commission’s data collection efforts). 
205 See 2009 Ark. Acts 4195. 
206 Id. at § 2(4). 
207 Id. at § 2(8). 
208 Id. 
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functioning fairly and equitably.”209
In sum, while most states do not appear to be collecting data on the 
economic status of people within the criminal justice system, a few states 
appear to be moving in that direction.  States need to understand that the 
task is not as large as it might at first seem.  Some actors within the criminal 
justice system—most notably corrections department and pretrial services 
agencies—already gather much data from defendants, so the primary 
mechanism that needs to be instituted involves: (1) rounding out the scope 
of the information gathered from each defendant and (2) compiling and 
preserving the data that are collected.  For every state, the potential 
advantage of assembling such data involves nothing less than building a 
criminal justice system that works in the most effective way possible.  The 
benefits of taking these modest steps therefore should be well worth the 
cost. 
  Because Arkansas currently does not 
collect most of the data described by the legislature, the task force will have 
to analyze the best way to collect these data and make a proposal to the 
legislature to implement that plan. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The criminal justice system needs data on economic status both in 
order to develop rational policy and in order to ensure equal treatment.  
Some data already are being collected, and we need to begin the process of 
analyzing that data.  States also, however, need to begin collecting data on 
economic status in their own jurisdictions so that they have more specific 
data from which to develop sound laws and policies.  Agencies in some 
states already collect this data, and other states can easily put in place 
similar data collection programs.  All states must also take steps to compile 
the information they do collect into usable databases.  Most importantly, 
once the data have been collected and analyzed, that analysis needs to be 
used to focus attention on economic status, just as data were used to focus 
attention on drug addiction and mental illness.  The development of 
programs targeted at poor people has the potential to reduce crime rates 
significantly, but that potential can only be realized if policymakers focus 
on the issue and develop coherent policy responses. 
 
209 Id. at § 2(8). 
